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INTRODUCTION
In the field of teleccminunications , technological
progress has deeply changed the competitive structure
betv/een broadcasters, cable operators and telephone compa-
nies. The boundaries between different types of communica-
tions media and their functions become increasingly diffi-
cult to distinguish -'- . The dissolving distinctions betv;een
printed and broadcasted press on one hand and between
common carriers and broadcasters on the other hand have
also changed the legal and economic environment for the
media-participants these recent years. As the borders
between the different types of media grow more vague, the
traditional criteria and justifications for media-regula-
tion have become insufficient and in need of new definiti-
ons ^
.
-^ Television signals now carry information channels
via the teletext systemi. Telephone lines are used for
transfer of database information and for telefax. The
proposed entry of the telephone comipanies into the business
of video programming via fiber optics is the most recent:
example of the shifting boundaries in the telecommunica-
tions market. See , e.g. , The Continuing Arguments Over
Telco Entry , Broadcasting, Dec. 26, 1988, at 58.
2 Scarcity in the radio-spectrum, for example, was one
of the main justifications for regulating broadcast
activities. See Chapter I.l.a. and notes 25-32. But since
cable television and other techniques for real-time
delivery of video programming have emerged, the scarcity
2A major problem arising out of this funczLonb.! and
technical overlap between different types cf media, is the
enhanced threat for concentration of media corporations.
Since developments in electronic com-munications enable
broadcasters and publishers to be present all around the
world, they needed to grow and to integrate their activi-
ties. And because such undertakings require large capital
investments, only justifiable under sufficient econom.ics cf
scale, the concept of corporate bigness entered the v/orld
of modern media-management. For the broadcasting sector,,
this evolution became only possible since the deregulation
wave in the early 1980 's -^ . But other sectors of the
telecommunications sector underwent some changes also ^,
rationale became more and more obsolete. See Chapter II. 2.
and notes 170-176.
^ Deregulation started under the Carter Adm.inistration
in the late 1370 's, resulting in Deregulation of Radio , 84
FCC 2d 960 (1981). Television was deregulated by the Reagan
appointed FCC in 1984 : Deregulation of Commercial Televi-
sion , 98 FCC 2d 1076 (1984). That sam.e year, cable televi-
sion was freed from control by local municipalities through
the 1984 Cable Policy Act . See Chapter I.2.c. and notes
119-139.
^ In 1982, an antitrust suit against AT&T resulted in
chopping off the local telephone system.s into what became
seven regional companies. This divestiture, operated
through a settlement between AT&T and the Justice Depart-
ment, opened the market for com.petition in the telephone
sector, but also freed the mother company from, legal
restrictions to launch itself in the fast grov;ing and
profitable area of satellite communications. See , Schv/artz,
Flynn and First, Free Enterprise and Econom.ic Organization
: Antitrust 6th Ed., 193 (1933)
3driven by a political desire tc reduce gcvern.T'.ent interven-
tion and tc encourage competition -^
.
Never before in the history of mass communications
have airwaves, cable channels and retail bookstores been so
crowded with different produces. At the same time, hcv;ever,
changes in ownership of m.edia corporations occurred m.ore
and more frequently, resulting in an ever decreasing num.ber
of diversified owners of media-outlets °.
In writing this thesis, the author's m.ajcr concern
was to analyze the legal instruments through v/hich exces-
sive concentration of media-ownership in the United States
could be prevented. This concern is m.ore inspired by social
and informational values than by econom.ic issues of
ownership-concentration '. Since the subject of diversity
in media is vast and did not remain unexplored in the past
^ The political aspects of deregulation and its role
to foster U.S. competition in the worldwide telecomjr.unica-
tions market are described in Trustall J., Comjnunications
Deregulation : The Unleashing Of ^\merica's Comjnunicaticns
Industry (1986). After the telephone sector. High Defini-
tion Television will also enjoy preferential treatm.ent for
its development into foreign markets. See , Sixteen Big U.S
Firms To Form Groups To Develop Advanced TV Technology
,
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16, 1989
° See, e.g.
.
Never Have So Few Published For So Many
,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 19 1988, at 30.
' According to antitrust theories, a market dominated
by only one or a few producers is able to escape the
regular competition rules and tends therefore to set a
higher price than a market with real com.petition v/ould
result in. In media however, the dangerous consequences of
concentration are to be located in terms of diversity of
content and information.
4^, the focus of the thesis is narrov^ed dov;n. to a highly
actual topic, reflecting much of whan is going en today in
the field of telecommunications: the rc-gulation of the
competitive structure betv/een the broadcasters and the
cable operators. More precisely, the research v;ill focus on
the controversy around the constitutional validity of so-
called must-carry rules, which were enacted by the Federal
Communications Commission ^ in 1965 to preserve the
Commissions policy goals with respect to broadcasters
against the growing expansion of cable television ^^
.
Originally, the FCC welcomed the quick growth of cable
television as a vehicle for promoting its goals of diversi-
ty and media-deconcentration under its authority over
broadcasters activities. However, the technical nature of
cable and its development into an industry with far more
economic potential than traditional broadcasting, have
spurred an evolution that runs afoul of established
principles in case-law and Congressional policy v;ith
respect to the safeguarding of diversity of inform.aticn and
ov/nership in the audiovisual market. Under the disguise of
° See , e.g. , Compaine, Benjamin M. , Christophe H.
Sterling, Thomas Guback and J. Kenderick Noble, Jr., Who
Owns the Media ? Concentration Of Ownership In The Mass
Com.munications Industry , 1979. Owen, Structural Approaches
To The Problem Of Network Economic Dominance , 197 9 Duke
L.J. 191. Note, A Regulatory Approach To Diversifying
Comjnercial Television Entertainment , 8 9 Yale L.J. 69 4
(1980)
^ Hereinafter called the FCC
^° See Chapter I. 2. a. and notes 98-108
deregulation and First: Amendment claims, the cable industry
managed to become seme kind of an unregulated m.cncpclv,
disregarding important policies that were developed in this
country since the advent of the electronic media. The
political climate that dominated the FCC during the past
decade favored deregulation and reliance on marketplace
forces ^-^ . Because this evolution went parallel with a
looser antitrust enforcement policy by the Adm.inistration,
the danger for economic concentration in the field of the
mass media is far from hypothetical -^2.
The purpose of this thesis is twofold: in the first
place, an analysis of broadcasting regulations and subse-
quent case-law will demonstrate the concern by the legis-
lator and regulatory agency to preserve diversity in
opinion and media-ownership through emphasis on "localism."
and a "marketplace of ideas" -^^. Arguments will be develo-
ped to show that cable television activities, although
^^ The philosophy of this policy is described in
Fowler and Brenner, A Marketplace Approach To Broadcast
Regulation , 60 Texas Law Review 207-257 (Feb. 19S2)
^^ The most recent example of media-concentration is
the proposed merger between Warner Communications and Tim.e
.
See , Time And Warner To Merge, Creating Largest Media
Company , N.Y. Times, March 5, 1989, at 1. Bleeping Up With
the Murdochs , Business Week, March 20, 19S9, at 32-36.
For the mergers effect on the cable television market:
Time Warner Is Wired For Cable Wars , Business Week, April
17, 1984, at 44 and Time-Warner Could Have An Anticom.-
petitive Effect In The Cable Television Business , N . Y
.
Times, March 7, 1989, at 33.
^^ See Chapter I.I., dealing only with legislation
relating to television broadcasting.
6technically different from broadcasting, should be governed
by identical principles, and has been done so by Congress
-'^. These arguments will help to shed a different light on
the controversy around must-carry rules, v;hich v.-ere
considered paramount in the preservation of local broadcas-
ting and its public service to the comjr.unity. The author's
principal thesis in the first part of this article is that
must-carry rules could be construed as serving First
Amendment principles rather than violating them, and that
their invalidation by the lower judiciary is inconsistent
with long-standing Supreme Court rulings regarding First
Amendment rights and duties of media-participants and their
contribution to diversity, local self-expression and anti-
concentration. A parallel will then be drav/n between the
principles of free speech, as embodied in the First
Amendment, and the goals of anti-concentration in the
antitrust laws -^^. This parallel will serve as a pivot to
the second part of the thesis.
In that second part, current antitrust lav; v;ill be
analyzed to examine if and to what extent antitrust could
serve as an alternative means for local broadcasters to
seek carriage on the cable system,. This examination v/ill be
more hypothetical in nature, since the issue only became
important after the invalidation of the must-carry rules in
^^ See Chapter I.2.C., containing an analysis of the
1934 Cable Policv Act.
^^ See Chapter IV. and notes 267-283
1986
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PART I
CABLE REGULATION UNDER THE FCC
CHAPTER I
THE FCC'S JURISDICTION OVER CABLE
Although cable transmission is technically very
different from broadcast 2^, its history and development
have, initially, grown parallel ^-^ . In its early develop-
ment, cable television was intended to deliver broadcast
signals to localities where reception through the air was
difficult or impossible. A cominunity located in mountai-
nous areas would build an antenna on high ground to receive
the signals of nearby stations and transm.it them, through
cable to the households in the comjr.unity. Such system.s v/ere
called "Community Antenna Television" or CATV. Since cable
was the only means of bringing television service to these
remote areas, television broadcasters originally v/elcom.ed
2^ Cable television involves the transmission of
electrical signals over wires to television sets in homes
or elsewhere. The technique consists of a "head-end"
(studio or community-antenna) that is connected with all
the television sets of the system, through coaxial cables. A
single cable is capable of carrying a wide range of
television channels. There is no use of the spectrum for
transmitting these signals except for linking up tv;o rem.cte
systems by use of a m.icrowave antenna. This kind of point-
to-point transmission is distinct from, broadcast signals,
and is regulated as a common carrier.
-^ It is generally agreed that the first cable
operations began in 1948, but precisely where is a matter
of dispute. See, Cable, The First Forty Years , Broadcas-
ting, Nov. 21, 1938, at 35-49.
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this technique as a way to expand their audience beyond the
reach of their transmitter-waves '^^
.
It was soon realized, however, that cable could be
more than just an extension of che broadcast service. Its
greater channel capacity enabled cable operators to carry
many more signals from outside the area, to deliver a vast
variety of non-broadcast communication programs and to
produce original programming. Next to its technical
characteristics, the economic model on v/hich cable made its
earnings could put broadcasters in a competitive disadvan-
tage ^^. Cable posed a potential threat to the framework
that Tihe Federal Communications Commission had developed
for the broadcast industry. While cable was neither
telegraph nor telephone v;ire, neither radio nor television,
its relationship to the traditional facilities regulated by
the FCC was plain. Cable was initially regulated through
the same regulatory philosophy applied in the broadcasting
22 Franklin M. , Mass Media Law , 3rd Ed., 909 (1983)
2-^ Cable operators charge subscribers a fee for the
right to view their programming. Many types of fee may
exist : a basic fee for the traditional cable services v;ith
retransmission of over-the-air programs. An extra fee for
special programs (Pay-TV), self -originated or delivered by
a cable-caster. A cable system is therefore assured to have
a steady, monthly revenue from its subscribers. In addi-
tion, it can sell advertising time. But most cable systems
derive less than 5 % of their gross revenue from, adverti-
sing. ( A Short Course In Cable , Broadcasting/Cablecasting
Yearbook 1988, at D-3)
In contrast, broadcasters derive their revenues not b':^'
selling their signal to the viewer but by selling time to
advertisers. Their revenues are thus directly and only
related to their share of the audience and the interest of
the advertisers to invest their monev.
\ T
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sector. It is therefore instructive to consider the history
and bases of nhe statute that created the FCC ' s authority
and jurisdiction over broadcasters activities.
1) The 193 4 Coimnunications Act
a) Reasons for regnlatinq the Spectrum
When radio-transmission grev; popular in the early
days of the telecommunications history, the need for
regulation by the federal government became apparent. This
need was not spurred by the desire of government to
regulate this type of activity, but was recognized by the
industry itself, in order to avoid chaos on the airwaves
^"^
. The rationale for this intervention was twofold
^"^ Different statutes were enacted before 1934 :
1) The Wireless Ship Act of 1910 was the first federal
statute regulating the use of radio. It was lim.ited to
radio for point-to-point maritim.e communications and did
not allocate any frequencies. See , Kahn F, (Ed.), Documents
of American Broadcasting , 4th Ed. , 1984
2) The Radio Act of 1912 was the first ccm.prehensive
piece of radio legislation. Congress, basing its authority
on the Comjnerce Clause of the Constitution, made it illegal
to operate a radio station without a license from the
Secretary of Commerce. The Act, however, failed to provide
sufficient discretionary standards for the effective
regulation of broadcasting, which v/as still not envisioned
at this early stage of radio-development. In 1926, the
Secretary was denied authority to require a licensee to
broadcast only at specified times and only on designated
channels, for the Radio Act of 1912 gave him. no authority
to issue regulations. ( United States v. Zenith Radio Corp.
et al. , 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. 111. 1926)) Following a request
for clarification from the Secretary to the Attorney
General on this matter, (35 Op. Att.'y Gen. July 8 1926)
the crying need for more effective broadcast regulation
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1. The scarcity rationale
Government intervention in the use of the airwaves
was considered necessary co avoid chaos among the numerous
voices that wanted to communicate with the public by means
of the radio-electric spectrum '-^. This intervention has
been based upon the premise that the facilities for radio
were limited and therefore not available to all who may
wish to use the spectrum. The so-called scarcity rationale ^"^
became apparent. As a result, the Department of Comm.erce
abandoned its efforts to order the airwaves and urged the
radio industry to regulate itself. Chaos ensued as some 200
new stations crowded on the air sv/itching their frequencies
and locations and increasing their power at will. Broadcast
reception became jumbled and sporadic, and the clamor for
new regulation was supported by both the public and the
radio industry itself. The Radio Act of 1927 created the
Federal Radio Commission. Originally intended to be only a
temporary body, the Commission remained in power from, year
to year through various ac^s of Congress.
3) The search for a coherent regulatory standard was
not completed until the Communications Act of 1934 was
passed. ( 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. §
151 et seq. ) This Act granted regulatory power to an
administrative body, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC). The FCC developed a panoply of regulations that put
several duties on the privilege to use the airwaves. These
regulations were derived from, an interpretation of the
public interest standard. See infra , notes 41-49.
^•^ Douglas H. Ginsburg, Regulation of Broadcasting , at
46 (1978)
2° Justice Frankfurter depicted this rationale
accurately in his opinion in National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States , 319 U.S. 190 ( 1943 )( hereinafter NBC v. US )
... (radio) facilities are limited; they are
not available to all who m.ay v;ish to use them..
The radio spectrum, is simply not large enough
to accommodate everybody. There is a fixed
natural limitation upon the num.ber of stations
that can operate without interfering v.'ith one
another. Regulation of radio was therefore as
vital to its development as traffic control was
to the development of the autom.obile.
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differentiates brcadcasting from the c-her media and
explains why its fraedcm of expression is more limited ^'.
Scarcity beget a licensing scheme to ensure orderly use of
frequencies and a consequent concern that the public be
exposed to diverse information and views. The development
and legitimation of this regulatory scheme grew parallel
with the rapid expansion of the use of the airwaves -^2.
The FCC was, under the scarcity rationale, not only
entitled to allocate licenses and frequencies, but also to
regulate the relationship between broadcasters and net-
works, and to issue rules preventing anticcm.petitive
behavior such as the "Chain Broadcasting Rules" ^'
.
Id. , at 213.
^"^ Scarcity m.ay not be interpreted in its numerical
term : there are far more broadcasting stations in the U.S.
than there are newspapers. But two nev/spapers can, without
governmental intervention, physically operate in the sam.e
community at the same time. In radio, hov/ever, if there is
only one frequency in the spectrum available for use in a
particular community, they cannot, by the law of physics,
operate together, for to do so would result in neither
being heard.
^^ Reserving only a part of the spectrum for the
actual licensing system has been called "the original
electromagnetic sin". ( Fowler and Brenner , supra , note 11,
at 212) Alternatives have been proposed, such as auctioning
of frequencies to the highest bidder. (Todd Bender, A
"Better" Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation , 3 6
Fed. Comm. L.J. No. 1, 27-68 (July 1934))
2^ In 1943, the Supreme Court upheld the Chain
Broadcasting Rules under the scarcity rationale in NBC v.
US , supra note 26. Chief Justice Frankfurter described the
FCC as "more than a kind of traffic officer, policing the
wave lengths to prevent stations from, interfering with each
other" ( 319 U.S. at 216)
.
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In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC -^^ the scarcity rationale
was held to justify the duty imposed on broadcasters to
cover discussions of public issues and that each side of
those issues must be given fair coverage ^-^ . Scarcity
provided thus an argument for the FCC to regulate both
structure and programming of broadcasters, within consti-
tutional limits ^2.
2 . The Impact Theory
In FCC V. Pacifica Foundation ^^ , the Supreme Court
observed that "the broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the live of all Americans"
and that they are "uniquely accessible to children, even
those too young to read" '^^ . The Court repeated the leveled
First Amendment protection for different m.edia, as expres-
sed in Burstyn v. Wilson ^-', and concluded that "of all
20 395 U.S. 367 ( 1969 )( hereinafter Red Lion )
-^•^ This so-called Fairness -Doc trine was repealed by
the FCC ( Inquiry into Section 73.1910 : Fairness Report of
1985 , 102 FCC 2d 143) and is distinct from the Equal
Opportunity Rule (§ 315 Comm.unications Act) that equal time
be alloted to all qualified candidates for public office.
See also note 77.
^^ These limits and its critiques thereon will be
analyzed in Ch. II.
2
33 438 U.S. 726 ( 1978 )( hereinafter Pacifica)
2^ Id^, at 747
25 343 U.S. 495 (1952)
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forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has
received the most limited First Am.endmen-c protection" ^'^
.
It upheld the Commission's determ.ination that "indecent"
broadcasts, as identified in Congressional statutes and
defined by the agency, could be punished.
This theory was developed by the Supreme Courn in
1978, at a time when broadcasting already existed for about
30 years. It can be supplemented with the argum.ent that
government, members of Congress and judges regulate
broadcasting because they perceive broadcasting as posses-
sing extraordinary power and because they fear the unknov/n
consequences of that power '^'^ . Therefore, authorities
clearly sought new grounds for regulating this industry,
since the scarcity rationale has lost strength through a
technological "channel-boom" and a subsequent deregulation
of the airwaves ^^. The impact theory has recently assumed
increasing prominence to counterbalance the unraveling of
the scarcity rationale during this last decade ^^. The
Commission's involvement in protecting children and adults
from television's "captive quality" is undoubtly content-
^° Pacif ica , supra note 33, at 747
^"^ P. Parsons, Cable Television and the First Amend-
ment , 27 (1987)
^^ See infra Chapter II. 2 and notes 170-176
^^ Lively D. , Deregulatory Illusions and Broadcasting:
The First Amendment's Enduring Forked Tongue , 66 North
Carolina Law Review 963-976, No. 55 (1988)
New Indecency Enforcement Standards To Be Applied To
All Broadcast And ;^jnateur Licensees, 2 FCC Rec . 2726 (1987)
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restrictive, and critics propose as an alternative that the
marketplace, speaking through advertisers, critics and
self -selection by viewers, provide an adequate substitute
b) The Public Interest Standard
The FCC, in granting licenses to the various appli-
cants, is often confronted with the difficulty of making a
choice among the various candidates. It has, in drafting
its regulations, the duty to consider various aspects such
as concentration and public policy. It is prohibited from,
making considerations based upon content '^^ , but must guide
its preferences on standards aim.ed at m.axim.alizing the
service to the public, in casu the local comm.unity.
The 1934 Communications Act established a discretion-
ary licensing standard: the public interest, convenience
and necessity ^'^ . The Supreme Court has interpreted this
standard as a broad one, "a power not niggardly but
expansive" ^-^, encompassing many regulations and a large
discretion to approve or deny applications for licensees
^'^ Fowler and Brenner, supra note 11
^^ § 426 of the 1934 Communications Act , 47 U.S.C.A. §
426
"^^ This standard is used several tim.es in the Statute:
see 47 U.S.C.A. § 303, 307(a), 307(d), 309(a), 310 and 312
^^ See NBC v. US, supra note 26, at 219
17
^^
, or to regulate industries which are distinct but
closely related to broadcasters, such as the networks '^^.
The Court described the public interest standard also as a
"supple instr^jjnent for the exercise of discretion by the
expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its
legislative policy". ^^ '^^ ^^ "^^
c) A Policy Emphasis based on Localism and Trusteeship
The public interest standard expresses the view that
a broadcaster is not a mere businessman, selling a common
asset to the advertisers and providing plain entertainm.ent
•^"^
"to deny a station license because the "public
interest" requires it, is not a denial of free speech" Id.
at 227
^^ see NBC v. US , supra, note SS
"^^ FCC V. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. , 309 U.S. 134
(1940)
'^' Critics read this discretionary standard as meaning
"about as little as any phrase or word the drafters of the
Act could have used and still comply with the constitution-
al requiremenr that there be some standard to guide the
administrative Wisdom of the licensing authority." (Cald-
well, The Standard Of Public Interest, Convenience And
Necessity As Used In The Radio Act Of 1927 , 1 Air L. Rev.
295 (1930))
^° In the proposed "rewrite" of the Communications Act
in 1978, authored by the House Subcommittee on Communica-
tions, m.ajor revisions were foreseen for broadcast regula-
tions. The most remarkable of these was that no single
reference was made any more to the "public interest"
standard. See H.R. 13015, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., June 6, 1973
^^ The task of defining this standard is open for the
Courts, Congress or the FCC itself : in FCC v. National
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting
,
(435 U.S. 775 (1973 )m.
hereinafter National Citizens ) upholding the FCC ' s cross-
ownership rules, the Court stressed the Corn-mission's broad
discretionary power to determine the public interest.
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to its audience. Rather, a broadcaster v;as considered a
"public trustee", endov/ed with an exclusive grant from the
governinent to use the radio spectrun. In return for this
privilege, the broadcaster had to comply with a number of
duties that were defined by the Commission under the vague
public interest standard. The privilege to use the air-
waves, which were considered public domain, was conditioned
not only on content -^^ , but also on citizenship -'^,
personal integrity -''^ , and ownership of other media -'^.
Over the years, the public trusteeship approach was
gradually developed into a body of program-ming guidelines
that put emphasis on four important considerations deter-
mining the Commission's decision whether or not to grant or
renew a license:- 1) local and network programs on a
sustaining (i.e. noncommercial) basis 2) local live
programs 3 ) programs devoted to discussion of public issues
and 4) station efforts to limit the amount of time devoted
^^ Fairness Doctrine , recently abolished by the FCC.
See Syracuse Peace Council , 2 FCC Rec. 5043 (1987) and Ch.
II.
2
^^ Communications Act 1934 § 310, 47 U.S.C.A. § 310 (1982)
^^ Policy regarding Character Qualifications in
Broadcast Licensing , 102 FCC 2d 1179 (1986)
-'^ Multiple Ownership Rules forbid a single entity
from owning more than one station of the same type in the
same market. (47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1986)) Crossov/nership of
a broadcast station and cable system in zhe same market is
also prohibited. ( Id. § 73.501.") See infra note 65.
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to hourly advertising -''^ . A heavy emphasis was put on the
local character of the broadcaster: his principal duty was
to make a "diligent, positive effort to discover and
fulfill the tastes, needs and desires cf his service area.
If he has met this he has met his public responsibility."
^^ The trusteeship model turned an operator into a super-
citizen, with obligations that go beyond providing goods
and services that the public desires. Critics contend that
this regulation is unnecessary burdensome and that it
contains a form of "taxation without representation 56r- •
Another critic is that broadcasters have been subjected to
restrictions that bear no relation to the marketplace ^'^
.
^^ See the so-called "Blue Book" of the FCC ' s Public
Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (1946)
^^ ReDort and Statement of Policv, 44 FCC 2303 (1960)
^° R. Posner, Taxation by Regulation , 2 Bell J. Econ.
& Mgmt. Sci. , 22 (1971)
^' The grandest myth of the trusteeship
model is the belief that the value of
the licenses has remained unchanged
since their granting. The Comjnission
has ignored that tremendous wealth
attaches to the most desirable
licenses, whose value far exceeds the
tangible assets of the stations
holding them. Instead of adopting
regulations that would reflect the
actual value of these licenses, the
Commission has buried its head deeper
into the regulation books and
considered additional behavioral
rules. Such efforts have merely
produced more obligations for these
special public stewards who, in turn,
are usually willing to comply with
whatever the Commission asks, as long
as the cost of compliance is slight.
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d) Goals of Diversity and Anti-Concentraticn
One premise upon which the First ^jTiendraent is based
is the existence of a "flourishing marketplace of ideas,
with truth not from governmental regulation but, rather,
from the clash of many voices ^°. Where no government
regulation is constitutionally permitted, the economic
marketplace will determine the number of voices to be
heard. The government's role is limited to ensuring
(through appropriate antitrust involvem.ent and legislation)
that the economic model succeeds ^^.
In broadcasting, the question arises how the FCC
should act to prevent concentration of media ownership and
a decrease of the plurality in the spectrum °^. This task
has been recognized by the Supreme Court as making part of
the public interest standard ^-^. In answering this ques-
tion, it is useful to distinguish betv/een rules that have
an impact on the programming and rules that have not °2.
Fowler and Brenner ^ supra note 11, at 221.
^^ Associated Press v. United States , 326 U.S. 1 (1945
^^ Mass Communications Law , West Nutshell Series, at
398. See also notes 276-277.
°^ The question whether the FCC can consider antitrust
questions in media and hov; private plaintiffs have standing
in a suit against a cable operator v;ill be examined in Part
II. of this thesis.
^1 NBC V. U.S. , 319 U.S. 190 (1940) and United States
V. Storer Broadcasting Co. 351 U.S. 192 (1956)
°^ This distinction will reappear in a further part of
this thesis discussing the validity of must-carry rules in
the cable television sector. See Ch. III.3.e. and notes
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1 . Speech-neutral P3gulaticn
This set of rules aims az. regulating the structure of
the media-industry by preventing concentration of ov.'nership
or restrictive agreemenns between prograin-suppliers and
broadcasters with the goal to promote diversity.
There are several ways to attack the problem:
a. One way is to prevent the networks from imiposing
their power on the licensees. Such was the case in NBC v.
United States ^^ , where the Supreme Court upheld the so-
called Chain Broadcasting Rules as being consistent with
the public interest standard and the statutory duties of
the Commission °'^.
b. Another way is to attempt to diversify the
ownership of broadcast facilities through imposing a limit
on the number of outlets one single entity m.ay ov;n (multi-
ple ownership rules) or to prohibit ov;nership of identical
or integrated media, such as a nev.'spaper and a broadcast
station, in the same community ( cross -ov.'nership rules) °^.
248-251.
°^ See supra , note 26
^^ See Barrow R. , Antitrust & Regulated Industry :
Promoting Competition In Broadcasting , 196 4 Duke L.J. 2S2-
306
°^ Multiple Station Ownership has been relaxed from a
7-7-7 rule to a 12-12-12 rule (See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)
and Multiple Ownership-Seven Stations Rules, 56 R.R. 2d 359
(1984)). Under the revised rules, an entity can ov;n up to
12 AM stations, 12 FM stations, and 12 television stations
as long as the TV stations collectively serve less than 25
% of the nation's TV homes.
Qne-to-a-Market Rules forbid a single entity to own a
22
Rules limiting media cross-ownership are based on concerns
about industry ccncencration and com.peti cion. These issues
are also addressed by the antitrust lav/s. Here, cross-
ownership rules address the issue of the public interest in
a diversity of information sources. The congruence between
diversity of opinion, application of the antitrust lav/s and
the First Amendment has been recognized by the Supreme
Court in Associated Press v. United States °°. It is
commonly thought that a diversity of media-owners provides
greater assurance of a diversity of speakers. Similar rules
have been promulgated for multiple ownership of broadcas-
ting outlets and networks, and were upheld by the Courts ^"^
68
radio and a television station in the same market, with
exceptions made for the so-called "grandfathered" com.bina-
tions. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1936)
Cross-Ownership Rules prevent the comm.on ownership of
a broadcast facility and a newspaper in the same market.
Combinations existing before the enforcement of these rules
(1978) were all grandfathered v/ith the proviso that they
could not be sold as a unit to a third party.
See Sherman B., Telecommunications Management : The
Broadcast & Cable Industries , 17 3, (1987) and Concentration
of Ownership of the Media of Mass Comjnunication : An
Examination of new FCC Rules on Cross Ov;nership of Collo-
cated Newspapers and Broadcast Stations , 2 4 Emorv L.J. 1121
(Fall 1975)
For Cable-Broadcasting Crossov/nership Rules see Ch.
I.2.C. and notes 119-139.
^^ 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See also Ch. IV. and notes 269-
283.
^"^ See U.S. V. Storer Broadcasting Co. , and NBC v.
U.S.
, supra notes 61 and 26.
°° D. Brenner and M. Price, Cable Television and Other
Non Broadcast Video : Law and Policy , at 4-5 (1984).
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c. Rules that prevent local broadcast stations from
being deleted on the nearby cable syste.T.s are also ai.T.ed at
promoting diversity of sources and localism through
structural regulation °^. None of these rules affect the
content of the programjning and can be enforced v/ithout any
speech-interference.
d. Generally, antitrust laws are the best example of
a structural, i.e. speech-neutral, approach to promoting
diversity. The press has long been subject to the antitrust
laws '^'^. Although challenged initially, it has been widely
accepted that antitrust regulation of the press poses fev;
First Amendment problems precisely because it is content
neutral. By limiting concentration of the media, the
antitrust laws substantially increase the likelihood of
diversity in programming. Although such diversity is hard
to predict with certainty, it is reasonable to assume that
concentration will tend to stifle, rather than promote a
multitude of tongues '' '^.
°^ These must-carry rules will be subject of an
extensive analysis in Ch. III.
'^ See , e.g. . Associated Press v. United States , 326
U.S. 1 (1945) and Lorain Journal v. United States , 342 U.S.
143 (1951)
"^-^ Bazelon, The First Amendment And The "New Media" :
New Directions In Regulating Telecommunications , 31 Fed.
Comm. L.J. 201, 209 (1979). See also Ch. IV.
^2 In National Citizens (555 F.2d, 929 (1977) aff 'd
436 U.S. 775 (1978)), the D.C. Court of Appeals agreed that
diversity is difficult to measure, but that "the FCC can
rely on its sound judgment, based on experience, that true
diversity from a commonly owned station-nev.'spaper com.bina-
24
2. Speech-Affecting Regulation
These set of rules have been created to assure
diversity and localism within the programming. Broadcasters
have been subjected to a far more speech-intrusive regula-
tion than would be allowed constitutionally in the written
press, for example "-^. As the main justification for this
governmental intervention was provided by the scarcity
rationale '^, and this rationale became more and m.ore
undermined by technological development and a growing First
Amendment awareness with broadcasters and cable operators,
the Courts, for the last years, have scrutinized these
rules under a much more stringent constitutional standard.
The FCC, on its turn, has reconsidered many of these
regulations and withdrew them, sometimes without waiting
for judicial invalidation ' -^ '°.
tion would be unrealistic". Id. at 961. See also note 245.
'^ Different First Amendment standards have been
applied to different media : Burstyn v. Wilson , 3 43 U.S.
495 (1952). See also notes 140-152.
"^"^ See Red Lion , supra note 30.
'^ See repudiation of the Fairness Doctrine : supra,
note 50.
'° Only those regulations concerning obscenity and
indecency remained unchanged or have been severed. See
supra, note 39.
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a. Equal Tims Rule
Sec. 315 of the 1934 Comimunicaticns Act '' expresses
the concern of the lawmakers that a broadcasting facility
might improperly influence an election by affording only
one candidate access to its audience. Although clearly a
statute which regulates content, it has survived attacks on
its constitutionality "^^ . Most of the litigation involves
requests in the heat of an election campaign '^. Few
decisions have been reviewed by the courts until recently
b. Fairness Doctrine
Basically, Fairness is the obligation of a broadcas-
ter to afford reasonable opportunity for the presentation
of opposing viewpoints on matters of public controversy. It
vests a broad discretion in the licensee as to the amount
of time to be devoted to the controversy, the issues to be
covered and other programming decisions. In Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC ^^ the Fairness Doctrine and the
"77 47 U.S.C.A. § 315(a)
'^ For a recent example see Branch v. FCC , 824 F.2d.
37 (D.C. Cir. 1987) and infra, note 185.
'^
"In contrast with the Fairness Doctrine, § 315 is
quite precise in its application and leaves virtually no
room for broadcaster discretion. It operates v;ith a type of
mathematical certainty not usually found in broadcasting
regulation." Mass Communications Law , supra ncce 59, at 438
2^ See Franklin , supra , note 22, at 790.
Si 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
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related personal attack rules were upheld as consistent
with the First Amendment by an unaniT^cus Supreme Court. The
Court based its decision upon considerations of scarcity ^^
and on the need for diversity in the information dissemi-
nated to the public °-^ °'^.
In 1987, the FCC inquired the usefulness of the
Fairness Doctrine ^^ and concluded in response to a Court
mandate that the doctrine "contravenes the First J^jnendm.ent
and thereby disserves the public interest" °°. According to
the Commission, the growth of the electronic media had
^2 "Because of the scarcity cf radio f reciL:t::ywj.t;o
.
Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in
favor of others whose viev.'s should be expressed on this
unique medium." Red Lion , 395 U.S. at 390.
°-^ It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than
to countenance monopolization of that
market, whether it be by the govern-
ment itself or a private licensee.
Id.
,
quoting Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616 (1919)
(Holmes, J. dissenting). Associated Press v. United States
326 U.S. 1 (1945) and New York Times v. Sullivan 37 6 U.S.
254 (1964).
°^ A broad lecture of Red Lion suggested a "right of
access for the public to social, political, moral and
aesthetic ideas" Id. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
V. Democratic National Committee (412 U.S. 94 (1973)) the
Court, however, rejected this theory and reaffirm.ed the
rule that a broadcast station is not a comjr.on carrier which
must open its facilities on demand, even if the demand is
inspired by matters of public importance.
^^ Inquiry into § 73.1910 : Fairness Report 102 FCC 2d
143 (1985) 58 R.R.2d 1137.
°° In re Syracuse Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion
and Order , 2 FCC Red 5042 (August 6, 1987)
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removed the scarcity rationale of Red Lion and did no
longer justify controls upon program content °' °° °^
.
c. Prime Time Access Rules
This set of rules reflects a concern v/ith the lack of
local programming activity among netv/ork affiliates. The
rules limit the presence of netv/ork programs on the
affiliates' antenna during the four hours of prime time ^'-'.
Exceptions are made for nev/s and educational network
programs
.
d. Syndicated Exclusivity and Distant Signal Rules
Syndicated exclusivity limited the carriage of particular
programs on imported distant signals. These distant signals
were also limited in their num.ber to be im.ported by a cable
operator ^'^ . Syndex was based on a system of priorities
°' The personal attack rule remained unchanged. See 47
C.F.R. § 73.1920.
^^ Red Lion still remains the law. See note 1S2.
"^ In Telecommunications Research and Action Center v.
FCC, C.J. Borke concluded that Congress had not incorpora-
ted the Fairness Doctrine in the Communications Act when it
amended the Statute in 1959. The opinion also strongly
rejected the scarcity rationale and suggested that the
Supreme Court should come up soon with a m.ore v;orkable
alternative : 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reh'g en banc
denied, 806 F.2d 115, cert, denied , 107 S. Ct. 3196
(applying political broadcast rules to teletext).
^0 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (h
91 Se
143 (1972)
e Cable Television Report and Order, 36 FCC 2d at
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that generally protected a local station against having its
programming duplicated on the same day by cable carriage of
a distant station ^^ . Through this system, the FCC wanted
to preserve the syndicated market for broadcasters ^•^.
Both syndex and distant signal rules v/ere repealed by
the FCC in 1982, considering that "com.petition from cable
television does not pose a significant threat to comjnercial
television" ^'^. On May 18, 1988, the FCC reinstituted a
simplified form of syndicated exclusivity rules and
extended the scope of the existing network nonduplication
rules ^-^.
92 Id. at 181
^^ Syndicated programming is norm.ally sold on a
market-exclusive basis, but the importation of syndicated
programming made it impossible to guarantee market exclusi-
vity. The Commission responded by requiring cable systems
in major markets to black out distant syndicated programs
when local commercial stations owned the exclusive rights
to the broadcast of these programis.
The Network Nonduplication Rules remained unchanged :
these rules require that cable system.s v/ith m.ore than 100
subscribers delete the network programs of duplicating
distant stations under certain circumstances. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.92-76.99 and Mass Communications Lav/ , supra , note 218,
at 488-489.
^^ Cable Television Economic Inquiry Report 71 FCC 2d
661 and Syndicated Exclusivity Rules 79 FCC 2d at 680-81,
aff 'd in Malrite v. FCC 652 F2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981)
The arguments for this repeal were used also for
challenging must-carry. See infra , Ch. Ill.l.b. and note
218.
^^ See Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulem.aking 2 FCC
Red. 2393 (1987).
Under the New Syndex Rules , a broadcaster can again
negotiate with its program suppliers for enforceable
exclusive exhibition right with respect to syndicated (i.e.
non-network) programming within certain geographic parame-
ters. With a few limited exceptions, a station that has
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2) The FCC's ExtGnsion of Jurisdiction over Cable
The FCC has long been concerned abour the possibility
that cable television systems operating in the service area
of broadcast stations can fragment and dilute the audience
of those stations. As early as 1959, the Commission issued
a Notice of Inquiry to study the problem and concluded that
"there is a likelihood, or even a probability of adverse
economic impact for auxiliary system.s upon regular televis-
ion stations" ^°. At that time, hov/ever, it was reluctant
to exercise jurisdiction over cable, finding that CATV was
neither common carrier nor broadcaster, and therefore not
included within either of the principal categories created
by Sec. 151 of the Communications Act ^'.
a) the 1965 and 1966 Rules
In 1965, the Commission changed its position in its
First Report and Order ^^, by undertaking a comprehensive
obtained such exclusive rights to a program may require the
cable system to cease carrying that program..
Under the New Network Nonduplication Rules , the FCC
does not limit network non-duplication protection to any
particular period of time, leaving it to the networks and
their affiliates to determ.ine a mutually agreeable arrangem.ent
^^ CATV and TV Reporter Services, 26 FCC 403 (1959)
97 Id.
^^ First Report and Order , 38 FCC 683 (1965) Docket
No. 14.895. Second Report and Order , 2 FCC 2d 725 (1966).
The first decision indirectly affecting cable transmission
was Carter Mountain Transmission v. FCC , 32 FCC 459 (1962)
aff 'd 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.) cert, denied 375 U.S. 951
(1963), where the Commission, under its authority over
commion carriers, denied an application for a cable m.icro-
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regulation of the industry. Fully recognizing that the
statutory basis for its jurisdiction was far from explicit,
the Commission believed that oversight v/as imperative lest
the "explosive" growth of the cable industry underm.ine the
regulatory framework already established for ordinary
broadcast television ^^. It argued that without the pov;er
to regulate cable it could not discharge its statutory
obligation to provide for "fair, efficient and equitable"
distribution of service am.ong "the several States and
communities" 100.
1 . Cable as a Complement to Broadcasting
CATV made it possible "to realize one of the most
important goals which have governed (the FCC's) allocations
programming -^Ol^ But, if permitted to grow unfettered, the
Commission feared, cable m.ight well supplant ordinary
broadcast television. One of the cardinal objectives of the
FCC was the development of a system of free local broadcas-
ting stations, such that "all comjr.unities of appreciable
size will have at least one television station as an outlet
wave system because of its probable economic dam.age to a
local TV station.
^^ See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. , 392
U.S. 157 (1968) and Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC , 768 F.2d
1434 (1985)
100 47 U.S.C.A. § 307(b)
.
101 First Report and Order , supra , note 95, at 699
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for local self -c-xpression" "^^^ . CATV, because of its
prohibitive cost of extending the cables beyond heavily-
built-up areas, would not be available everywhere. Many
persons would still be entirely dependent upon local or
nearby stations for their television service. And the
growth of cable might not be at the expense of those
dependent on the grov;th of television broadcast facilities
for an adequate choice of services. Therefore, while CAT^/
is "capable of making a valuable contribution toward the
achievement of expanded television reception service, in is
of the utmost importance to the overall public interest . .
.
that CATV systems and television broadcast facilities have
complementary rather than conflicting roles" 10-^.
2 . Goals of Diversity and Localism
The rules that were implemented by the First and
Second Report and Order can be read as an overprotective
measure favoring the broadcasters ^'^^ and their role
envisaged by the FCC ' s policy '^^^ . It is clear, however.
^^2 Id. See also US v. Southwestern Cable , 392 U.S. at
174 and nore 99.
103 Id.
^'^'^ he FCC enacted three types of rules in its 1965-
1966 decisions : 1) must-carry rules 2) netv/ork non-
duplication rules (requiring the cable operator to delete
duplication of network programs from imported signals) and
3) syndicated exclusivity rules. See supra
,
note 93.
'^^ Up to 1979, the FCC called conventional broadcas-
ting "society's chosen instrum.ent for the provision of
video services" : Inquiry into the Economic Relationship
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that the FCC wanted to protect also a policy and interest
that reached beyond the narrov; broadcast-cable relation-
ship: the social desirability for a diversity of opinions,
as expressed in Associated Press v. United States ^0°. This
policy could be developed through a "commercial television
system based upon the distribution of programs to the
public through a multiplicity of local station outlets"
^^"^
. To the extent that this Marketplace of Frogram.s could
be disturbed by the advent of CATV, the Corn-mission entitlea
itself authority to regulate cable by requiring it to carry
the nearby stations on its system.. In so doing, it conside-
red CATV and broadcasting as alternative v;ays for m.aking
television programs for the public, and prevented a fierce
competition between them which would ultimately result in
the elimination of traditional broadcast services in som.e
areas -^^^
,
between Broadcasting and Cable Television , 71 FCC 2d 632
(1979) (hereinafter Economic Inquiry Report )
10^ 326 U.S. 1 (1945)
^^' First Report and Order
,
supra , note 93, at 700.
108 This is not in any way to ignore or
to denigrate the very real contribu-
tion which CATV service makes to the
public interest. Our conclusion is
rather that CAT"/ serves the public
interest when it acts as a supplem.ent
rather than a substitute for off-the-
air television.
Id. at 701
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b) the Reasonably Ancillary Doctrine
In United States v. Southwestern Cable -''^^ the Supreme
Court upheld the FCC's issuance of an order tc comply v.'ith
the Commission's 1965 rules. The Courr, without passing en
the validity of the specific rules, generally approved the
FCC's jurisdiction over cahle if "reasonably ancillary" to
its regulation of broadcast television "^-^^
.
The scope of this test has undergone som.e evolution.
In United States v. Midwest Video Corp. -^-^-^ the Court
seemed to give a broad interpretation to what v/as to be
considered as "reasonably ancillary" to broadcast televi-
sion. It upheld the FCC's jurisdiction tc require cable
systems with mere than 3.500 subscribers to originate a
substantial amount of local prcgramjning. The comm.ission was
entitled to impose regulations which enhanced services
provided by cable as well as which protected broadcast
television from cable. Chief Justice Burger, however, noted
in his concurring opinion that "the Commission's position
109 392 U.S. 157 (1968). See also supra, note 102
lip^^^ There is no need here to determine in
detail the limits of the Commission's
authority to regulate CATV. It is
enough to emphasize that the authority
which we recognize today under Sec.
152(a) is restricted to that reasona-
bly ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission's
various responsibilities for the
regulation of television broadcasting.
392 U.S. at 178.
1^^ 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (hereinafter Midv/est I
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strains the outer limits of even the open-ended and
pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions of the
Commission and the courts" -^-^^ .
These "outer limits" were soon narrov/ed by the D-C.
Court of Appeals in Hom.e Box Office v. FCC -'--'•-^, invalida-
ting the "anti-syphoning" restrictions on cable systems
^^'^
. And in 1979 the Supreme Court created confusion when
it refused the FCC authority to issue "access rules" for
cable television systems with 3.500 or more subscribers
11d 115 11
'.The rules failed the reasonably ancillary test
^12 Id. at 676
1^^ 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) cert, denied 434 U.S.
829 (1978)
il4
"Syphoning" occurs when a program, currently shown
on conventional free television is purchased by a cable
operator for showing on a subscription cable channel. As a
result, the program will be unavailable for shov/ing on the
free television system or its showing thereon will be
delayed. The FCC, by enacting the rules, wanted to prevent
that a segment of the American people - those in areas not
served by cable or those too poor to afford cable sub-
scription service - would receive delayed access on these
programs or be denied access altogether. Id. at 25.
^^^ FCC V. Midwest Video Corp. 440 U.S. 689 (1979)
(hereinafter Midwest II ) (C.J. Burger voted v.'ith the m.ajority)
•^^° Access channel rules required operators to set
aside channels for public use on a "f irst-com.e , non
discriminatory" basis, maintain basic production equipm.ent,
and have a minimum channel capacity. Midv.'est argued that
these rules treated cable as a common carrier, contrary to
§ 3(h) of the Act.
^^' The FCC defended the rules arguing that they would
promote "the achievement of long-standing com>m,unications
regulatory objectives by increasing outlets for local self-
expression, and augmenting the public's choice of pro-
grams". 1976 Report and Order, 59 FCC 2d 294, at 298.
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previously established. The Court distinguished its result
from that in Midwest I on the ground that the origination
rule at issue here did not go as far as the access rules.
The former did not abrogate the cable operator's control
over the composition of their programming, as do the access
rules. It compelled operators only to assure a more
positive role in that regard, one com.parable to that
fulfilled by television broadcasters -^^°.
c) The 1984 Cable Policy Act
When Congress passed in October 19S4 the Cable
Communications Policy Act, the jurisdictional question v;as
settled: the Act amended a Title VI to the 193 4 Communi-
cations Act to include specifically cable services. -'-^^ The
Commission had thus no longer to derive its authority from.
a broadcast-ancillary basis. But the Act did m.uch m.ore than
that: prior to its passage, uncertainty about the division
of authority between local and federal government was a
hallmark of cable regulation. There was a fragmented
regulation about the policy for franchising, its renewal
and the access requirements. Both the cable industry and
the cities (which were the major franchising authorities in
the nation) were concerned about the potential burden of
-^2 Midwest II 440 U.S. at 699-700.
^^^ Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 , Pub. L.
No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 2779
codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 521-559.
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this continued uncertainty. In scrr.e franchising areas,
cable operators were almost reguiaced as a public utilii:y.
Congress specifically prohibited regulation of cable
television as a common carrier or public utility -l^^.
An analysis of the objectives of the Act is useful to
demonstrate that certain values developed by Court and FCC
under the 1934 Communicaticns Act have now been explicitly
codified in the Cable Act ^^^ 122^
1 . Delimitating Local and Federal Authority
Prior to the Act, the division of authority betv;een
state and federal government had been developed through
"deliberately structured Dualism", a concept proposed by
the FCC ' s 1972 rules -'-^ . State and local government v/ould
be in charge of granting individual franchises and v/culd
regulate the construction and physical operation of cable
systems. The FCC would maintain exclusive jurisdiction over
what signals could be carried and over technical standards
of systems. Since this jurisdiction v;as interpreted v;idely
-20 47 u.S.C.A. § 522(6) (b)
.
^21 See generally 47 U.S.C.A. § 521.
122
-pi^^ standardization of franchise procedures and
renewals was a main objective of the Act but is not
relevant for the purposes of this research. A com.prcm.ise
had to be found betv/een the (national) goal of encouraging
growth and development of cable system.s and the (local)
goal of assuring that these systems are responsive to the
needs and interests of the local community.
12^ Cable Television Report and Order , 3 6 FCC 2d 143
(1972)
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by the FCC by imposing Access Rules and Syndicated Exclusi-
vity Rules, conflict about che legitiir.aticn of these
regulations v;as unavoidable •^^'^.
Congress intervened through the 198 4 Cable Policy Act , and
it is too early to assess whether it has acccn^.plished its
objectives. Looking at the evolution of the cable industry
since 1984, however, their interests have surely been
better served by the Act, giving rise to the allegation
that cable has now become an "unregulated monopoly" -'^^.
2 . Promoting Diversity and Competition
More important for our purposes are the goals of
assuring diversity of information sources and of prom.cting
competition in cable comjnunications . The drafters of the
Act had to balance First Ajr.endm.ent considerations preclud-
ing abridgment of speech with the desire to establish
structural rules that affirmatively encourage a diversity
of information sources '^'^^ . The 1984 Cable Policy Act
contains so-called leased access provisions, which require
that cable systems set aside a percentage of channels for
^^^ Most of the program-related federal rules v;ere
gradually eliminated as a result of Court or FCC decisions
See Home Box Office , Midwest II , supra , notes 111 and 113,
and the elimination of the syndicated exclusivity and
distant signal rules, supra , at note 94.
-^2^ Gregory, Regulating Cable TV : Quincy Cable's
Unnatural Approach To Cable's Natural Monopoly , 31 N . Y . L
.
Sch.L.Rev., 757-774 ( Sumjner 1986).
^26 See Associated Press v. United States , 326 U.S. 1
(1945) and supra, note 83.
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use by unaffiliated prograirjners ^'^' . These provisions are
also premised on a marketplace perspective of the First
Amendment in that they are designed to "assure that the
widest possible diversity of information sources are made
available to the public fromi cable sysrem.s" -28^ j^
addition, the Act clearly intends to prom.ote com.petition
and diversity 129, j_^ mandates to "promote com.petition in
cable communications and minimize unnecessary regulations
that would impose an undue economic burden on cable
systems" ^-^'-'. The Act clearly deregulates, but it is
unclear to what extent this might encourage competition,
given cable unique position of a natural m.oncpoly ^^^.
3 . Cross-Ownership Rules
The goals of Diversity and Anti-Concentration have
been realized through the Cross-Ownership Rules in Sec, 613
-'-^2. According to these rules, a cable operator may not own
a broadcast facility or a newspaper in the sam.e area. A co-
127 47 u.S.C.A. § 532.
12^ Cable Communications Act of 1984 , Pub. L. Mo. 98-
549 § 612(a), 98 Stat, at 2782). For a critique of these
leased access provisions and the marketplace perspective,
see William E. Lee, Cable Leased Access And The Conflict
Among First Amendment Rights And First ;^.m.endm.ent Values , 3 5
Emory L.J. No. 3, 563-619 (Winter 1986)
129 See infra , Ch. V and notes 284-319.
13° Id^, § 521(4) and (6)
.
131 See notes 292-301.
132 47 u.S.C.A. § 533. See also 47 C.F.R. § 76,501.
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ownership between a cable television system and a telephone
company in the same service area is also prohibited ^^^
^•^'^
. Sec. 613 maintained the ban on cross-ownership betv/een
cable and broadcast although some studies, conducted in the
early 1930 's, suggested elimination of both existing
national and local cross-ownership rules ^^^ . Congress
removed hereby the ability of the FCC to consider changes
or a deletion of the cross-ownership ban in the future ^^^ .
Clearly absent are any rules similar to the multiple-
ownership rules in the broadcasting sector ^'^'^ . The FCC had
earlier questioned the arbitrariness of these rules, and
raised the limit to a 12-12-12 combination, v.'ith an
-^^-^ This crossownership prohibition is at issue in the
debate about the telco entry into cable. See note 1.
^^^ Exceptions are made for rural areas, where cable
and telephone service delivery may go hand in hand. Id.
^^^ See FCC Network Inquiry Special Staff, Final
Report : "New Television Netv/orks : Entry, Jurisdiction,
Ownership and Regulation " (1980) (concluding that cross-
ownership would not adversely affect com.petition; cable/-
broadcast cross-ownership ban should be replaced by a rule
prescribing a threshold of ownership concentration)
and Staff Report of the FCC Office of Plan and Policy
: FCC Policy on Cable Ownership (1981) (despite extensive
common ownership of cable system.s with other media than
broadcast, and despite extensive vertical integration of
programming and distribution, there v/as little evidence
that cable system owners were exercising or could exercise
monopoly power in these markets)
ijD iphe FCC earlier declined to im.pose ov/nership
restrictions on cable television system.s : Report and
Order , Docket No. 18891, 91 FCC 2d, 46 (1982) and now
proposes to lift the ban on network cross-ownership : FCC
Advances Re-peal of Network-Cable Ban
, Broadcasting, Aug.
8, 1938, at 7.
^^
' See supra, notes 65-67.
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absolute limit on 2 5 % of the U.S. households ^^^. In
deciding not to adopt multiple ownership restrictions for
cable, the agency also relied srrongly on an additional
justification: the emergence of a more com.petitive national
communications marketplace and the slow disappearance of
spectrum scarcity as a rationale for an entire family of
corrective measures 1-^5. As a result, while broadcast
owners continue to live under a strict regim.e of multiple
and cross-ownership restrictions, cable operator systems
could merge without federal lim.it on the num.ber of urban
franchises that one entity could control.
At this point it becomes important to recognize the
existence of these Multiple System. Ov.'ners or MSO's and to
distinguish them from the individual cable system, opera-
tors. The issue of diversity appears under each of them, in
a different way: a decreasing num.ber of MSO's is fostered
by the absence of multiple ownership rules. On the local
level, diversity is jeopardized if broadcasters and other
voices of expression have no guaranteed access to the
system. After demonstrating a parallel concern betv;een the
Cable Policy Act and the FCC s broadcast policy, this
thesis will now continue to analyze the potential conflict
of these concerns with the First Amendm.ent.
12S See supra , note 65.
1-^° Brenner and Price, supra, note 68, at 4-S.
CHAPTER II
FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO CABLE REGULATION
1) Different Standards for different Media
The constitutional freedom of press has not been
granted to the same extent over the different types of
media. The First Amendment, al chough crafted in absolute
terms, has begotten different standards for different
sectors of the press. The regulation of each medium was
developed differently, and varied according to its novelty
in use or potential impact on the audience that v.'as meant
to be reached. Historical and sociological factors have
influenced the degree of intervention by the government
into the different vehicles for the free flov.' of ideas.
Generally, newer media of comm.unicaticn have been subjected
to a stricter control than the old. For many centuries,
newspapers, books and meetings v/ere the only m.eans of
public discussion and dissem.ination of information, so that
the need for their protection has been generally realized.
When additional methods for spreading facts and ideas v/ere
introduced or greatly improved, writers and judges had not
got into the habit of being solicitous about guarding their
freedom. So historically, we have tolerated censorship of
the mails, the importation of foreign books, the stage, the
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motion picture, and finally also the radio. -^"^^ The level
of regulation for media can thus in the first place be
related to its novel or customary use by the public.
A second factor that can determine the degree of
regulation is the perceived impact of the medium, on the
public. Some type of media were regulated m.ore restricti-
vely under the assumption that their potential pervasive-
ness on the public was too important to be left v/ith the
full protection of the First Amendment ^'^^
.
Generally, the Supreme Court, in calibrating variable
First Amendment standards, has focused its analysis m.ore on
structural differences rather than functional similarities.
By identifying each medium v/ith unique attributes of
technical or structural nature, the possibility of "abuses
and dangers" ^-^ was of more concern for the Court than
the rules jeopardizing the freedom, of expression '^'^-'
.
Because of this orientation, the construction of the
standards was predisposed tov.'ard official rather tan
140 Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 381 (1942)
^^^ See , e.g. , FCC v. Pacifica Foundation , 438 U.S.
726 (1978), CBS v. Democratic Nat ' 1 Comm.. , 412 U.S. 94, 116
(1973), Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC , 473 F.2d
16,49 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973)
and supra notes 3 3 and 84.
^^2 Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego , 453 U.S.
490, 501 (1981) at 501
143 See Metromedia , supra note 142, 453 U.S. 490, 501
(1981) (billboards). Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC , 395
U.S. 367, 386 (1978) (broadcasting), Quincy Cable TV, Inc.
v. FCC
, 768 F.2d 1434, 1433 (1985) (cable).
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marketplace regulation. The Fairness Doctrine v/as a good
example of such a media-specific content regulation ^'^'^
,
but the Supreme Court failed to explain exactly how
Fairness could be upheld in broadcasting but not tolerated
in the printed press ^'^^
.
The past years have been marked by a grov/ing critique
on this differentiated concept of First Amendment rights -
^'^^ and in particular the broadcasting industry was
subject to a series of fundamental changes that were aim.ed
to put it in line with other inform.ation-carriers -^^^ .
Parallel to this evolution, a deregulatory approach v;as
adopted to make the industry m.ore sensitive for the
economic forces of the marketplace I'^S^
-'^'^ Fairness responsibilities were tied upon the
premise that broadcasting was a uniquely scarce m.edium. See
Red Lion , supra , note 30.
^^^ Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo : A
Consistent Theory of Media Regulation , 28 Stan. L. Rev. 563
(1976)
-^^° See Fowler and Brenner , supra , note 11 and Lively ,
supra
,
note 49.
^^' See Fairness Report , note 35, follov/ed by Syracuse
Peace Council , 2 FCC Rec. 5043 (19S7) (abolition of the
Fairness Doctrine)
^'^^ Deregulation of Commercial Television , 93 FCC 2d
1076, 56 R.R. 2d 1005 (1984)
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a) Broadcasting
The regulatory restrictions imposed en broadcasters
have been developed to an extent that v;ould not be tolera-
ted, as a constitutional matter, with respect to printed
media, for example. First had to be determined if broadcast
was part of the press at all. Motion pictures v;ere excluded
from the First Amendment's purview for nearly forty years
after the Supreme Court originally denied them, press status
^^'^
. In 1952, the Court rejected this finding and held that
film was a constitutionally protected part of the press
^'^
. It also pointed out, however, that "it does not follov/
that the Constitution requires absolute freedom, to exhibit
every motion picture of every kind at all tim.e and all
places. Rather, the Court observed that because each m.edi'jjn
^'^^ See Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus '1 Com'n of Ohio 236
U.S. 230-244 (1915) (motion pictures originally adjudged to
be business and spectacle rather than press)
^-^^ Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson , supra , note 73
It cannot be doubted that m.oticn pictures are a
significant medium for the comm.unication of
ideas. They may affect public attitudes and
behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from,
direct espousal of a political or social
doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought v/hich
characterizes all artistic expression. The
importance of motion pictures as an organ of
public opinion is not lessened by the fact that
they are designed to entertain as v/ell as to
inform ... For the foregoing reasons, v;e
conclude that expression by means of m.oticn
pictures is included within the free speech and
free press guaranty of the First Am.endm.ent.
343 U.S. at 501.
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tends to present its own peculiar problems, constitutional
rules should be variable rather than uniforip. ^^^
.
As we have seen before, the two major justifications
for this regulatory burden v/ere the scarcity of the
spectrum -'^'^ and the assum.ed impact of the m.edium. on the
public '^-'^
.
b) Printed Press
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo -^^'^, the
Supreme Court unanimously struck dov;n a Florida statute
creating a right of reply to press criticism, of a candidate
for nomination or election. The Court granted a broad First
Amendment protection to the editors of the nev;spaper, .
holding that "the choice of m.aterial to go into a newspaper
. . . constitutes the exercise of editorial control and
judgment. It has yet to be dem.onstrated how governmental
regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
^•^^
... motion pictures are (not)
necessarily subject to the precise
rules governing any other particular
method of expression. Each method
tends to have its particular pro-
blems. But the basis principles of
freedom of speech and the press, like
the First Amendment's command, do not
vary. Those principles . . . make
freedom of expression the rule.
Id. at 502.
^^2 NBC V. US , and Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC ,
supra , notes 26 and 30.
-"^^ FCC V. Pacifica Foundation , supra , note 33.
^^^ 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (hereinafter Tornillo)
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consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press
as they have evolved to this time"-'--'^. Despite the func-
tional similarity of this right of reply v/ith the case
presented five years before in Red Lion , the Court never
referred to it nor tried to give any explanation for its
different approach towards these two types of m,edia-^°.
c) Cable
The examination of cable's First Amendment status
reaches the heart of this research topic. The problems that
will be analyzed arise because of cable's historical
development and the quasi absence of any First Amiendment
notions previously related to this type of industry.
At its inception, cable television v;as virtually an
unregulated, uncontrolled medium. In the early 196Q's, the
FCC assumed control of this young industry and issued more
and more rules on cable system, operators.-'--'' -'--'° -'--'^ At the
late 1970 's, the federal government was getting out of the
business of regulating cable, and the operators were
155 Id. at 25i
1^° For a comparison between the tv;c cases, see Mete,
Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo : A Consistent Theory of
Media Regulation , 28 Stan. L. Rev. 563 (1976)
-'•^' Parsons, supra , note 37, at 12.
158 See supra , Ch. I. 2. a.
1^^ We recall that in FCC v. Southv/estern Cable Co.
,
393 U.S. 157 (1968), these regulations v/ere upheld under
the Reasonably Ancillary Doctrine. See supra, note 110.
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beginning to find a First Amendir.ent voice. They began
claiming a constitutional status equivalent to that of
newspapers, magazines and books.
This position became mors and m.ore supported by the
courts. The main reason for this v;as the v/eakened authority
of the scarcity rationale: in Home Box Office v. FCC ^^'^
the Court of Appeals held the scarcity rationale not appli-
cable in government regulation of CATV.
The First Amendment theory espoused in National
Broadcasting Co. and reaffirm.ed in Red Lien
cannot be directly applied to cable television
since an essential precondition of that theory
- physical interference and scarcity requiring
an umpiring role for governm.ent - is absent
161
The Court referred to Tornillo -^°^ to hold that even if
there were scarcity "as a result solely of economic
conditions, (this) is apparently insufficient to justify
even limited government intrusion into the First Amendment
rights of the conventional press" -^^^ . Finally, the Court
noted that "there is nothing in the record before us to
suggest a constitutional distinction betv;een cable televi-
^^^ 567 F.2d 9,45 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert, denied 434
U.S. 829
1^1 Id^ at 44-45
^^2 Supra , note 154.
^^ Id. A similar reasoning led the Court in Tornillo
to grant newspapers large First Ajnendment protection.
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sion and newspapers on this point" 1^4 _ rj,y,_Q opinion
suggested that FCC regulation of cable could withstand
analysis under the First Amendjnent only if the Ccmrnission
proved that the regulation 1) burdened speech only inciden-
tally 2) served an important governmental interest and 3)
was no broader than necessary to further that interest ^^-^
.
The First Amendment status of cable has not been
determined satisfactory by the Supreme Court. In Midv/est II
the Court recognized that cable operators exercise "a
significant amount of editorial discretion regarding v/hat
their programming will include" 1°°, but added in a
footnote that it needed not to decide whether the cable
operator's editorial discretion is of the sam.e order as
that of a newspaper or a broadcaster '^^'.
In City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comjr.unications
,
Inc. -'°° the Supreme Court had to address directly the
constitutional rights of a cable operator who was refused a
franchise license by the city although there v/as sufficient
excess physical and economic capacity to accommodate more
than one system for the city.
^^^ Home Box Office , 567 F.2d at 45
16o This three-pronged test was derived from, the
constitutional test in United States v. O'Brien (391 U.S.
367 (1968)) and applied to the must-carry rules. See Quincy
Cable TV v. FCC , infra , notes 215-223.
^^^ 440 U.S. at 707
1^"^ Id_^ at n. 17
l^S 476 U.S. 488 (1986)
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Justice Rehnquist affirmed the Court of Appeals
decision that the City of Los Angeles had violated the
First Amendnient , but did so on narrower grounds. The
majority opinion recognized that the activities engaged in
by cable television coinpanies clearly implicated First
Amendment rights. But is was unv.'illing to decide the
appropriate degree of protection to be afforded cable
without the more complete factual record that the trial
could provide. Justice Blackmun concurred to em.phasize that
the proper First Amendment standard for cable was still
undetermined .
In assessing First Amendment claims concerning
cable access, the Court must determine whether
the characteristics of cable television make it
sufficiently analogous to another medium to
war-rant application of an already existing
standard or whether those characteristics
require a new analysis ... We lack factual
information about the nature of cable televi-
sion 1^9.
2) The Surrounding Climate: Deregulation and a Weakening
Scarcity Rationale
Focusing this chapter on cable television and its
First Amendment standing, it is important to realize zhe
political and economic climate that reigned in the FCC and
the telecommunications industry the lasr years. With the
change of the Administration in 1981, ic was argued that
-^^^ 476 U.S. at 496 (Justice Blackmun, concurring)
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the broadcast-industry was overregulated and that the
"public trustee" concept of a broadcaster did not reflect
the reality any more I'O. Deregulation should go hand in
hand with a "marketplace approach", where the public
interest would be best served through the free functioning
of the market forces. The role of the FCC should be reduced
to guard technical standards and regulations only. The
public interest would be defined by the public's interest
and not by the regulatory agency an^^.ore. The public
trustee model was abandoned and replaced by a "marketplace
approach" for the sake of creating increased competition
among broadcasters and other distributors of video-program-
ming. Two factors fueled this evolution. First, a hostile
climate against excessive government intervention and
regulation. Second, a technological revolution in DBS, MDS
and SMATV, increasing the num.ber of voices that could be
carried without altering the physical limitations imposed
by the spectrum or the natural monopolies of cable opera-
tors -' '' -^ . As a consequence, multiple ownership rules were
relaxed ^'^, administrative paperwork deleted, and the
l''-' See Fowler and Brenner , supra , note 11.
-"-'^ For a description of these new technologies, see
Stern, Krasnow,and Serkowski, The Nev; Video Marketplace And
The Search For A Coherent Regulatory Philosophy , 32 Cath.
U.L. Rev. , No. 5 29 ( 1983) .
-^'2 See supra, note 65.
51
transfer of broadcast-property became more flexible -^'^^.
Wall Street suddenly discovered the broadcast-business as
an interesting project for investment, and the industry v/as
welcomed in the game of corporate acquisitions, sell-outs
and concentration.
Cable did not remain unaffected by this evolution
^'^'^: being reduced for a long time to an extension of
broadcast operations, the industry underwent a maturing
process during the 1970 's. A distinction need to be made
between cable programmers or suppliers ( such as HBO or
TCI) and cable operators ( f ranchised by the municipali-
ties). Cable programmers discovered possibilities for
market growth through specialized program-ming and targeting
specific types of audiences. Cable offered a good alterna-
tive for the changing consumer-market, becom.ing more and
more fragmented and unwilling to accept the traditional,
family-orientated formats offered by the networks and their
affiliates. Cable operators, on their turn, reached an
mcreasmg part of the television watching households -'^.
^'^ Trafficking Rules for broadcast stations v.'ere
relaxed in 1986. See 47 C.F.R. § 90.135. There is no need
to secure federal approval of a transfer of ownership of a
cable system, although the Fee requires routine notifica-
tion. Id.
, § 76.400
^'^ Price Of Cable Television Companies Acquisitions
Is Continuing To Rise , N.Y. Times, June 27, 1988, at 30 and
Cable Systems Change Hands At Still Higher Prices , Wall
Street Journal, July 23, 1987, at 30.
1"^^ Cable household penetration reached 52,8 % in 1988
: Broadcasting , Nov. 21, 1988, at 10.
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While the critics of the scarcity rationale have been
mostly referring to the spur of the new technologies, cable
is the sector that has been most benefitting from the
deregulation.
The ongoing evolution of cable clearly conflicts with
the rationales that have inspired the earlier regulations,
which have been deleted to a great extent -^'°. Cable's
historical role as extension of broadcaster services and
its duties to serve the local community have been the major
causes of conflict with its constitutional claim.s. These
claims, hov;ever, have not only to do with a legitimate
concern and interest for free expression: at the basis of
this "First Amendment Awareness" was a commercial incen-
tive; the result of structural changes in the cable and
broadcasting industry. Cable operators, like broadcasters,
evolved from a local orientated business to a unit in an
^'^ Follows in brief the Cable Deregulation Process
1) the FCC's 1972 Rules took the "freeze" of cable,
permitting to import distant signals under a series of
restrictions
.
2) the Leapfrogging Rules were deleted in 1976.
3
)
Distant Signal Carriage and Syndicated Exclusivity
Rules were repealed in 1982
4) Congress enacted the 197 6 Copyright Act , creating
compulsory licenses and affirming cable operators' right to
import distant signals by paying semiannual royalties
5) the Ant i- Syphoning Rules were knocked down by the
Court of Appeals in Home Box Office in 1977, freeing HEO to
show movies still fresh form their theatrical release.
6) the 1984 Cable Policy Act , forged from a com.proraise
between cable and municipalities, affirmed the cities'
regulatory authority, but severely restricted it.
7) the must-carry rules v;ere declared unconstitutional
by the D.C. Court of Appeals in 1985
See Cable, the first 40 years
.
Broadcasting Nov. 21,
1988, at 44.
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nationwide chain or conglomerate, v/hatever the extent of
their First Amendment rights may he, it cannot serve to
justify these industries to grow unfettered and to merge
without any restrictions. If the scarcity rationale has
become obsolete, other aspects of the First Amendment and
applicability of the antitrust lav/s should be considered by
the Courts when they address the free speech claims of
cable and other media-companies.
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Regpiiem for Scarcity ? -^ ''
'^'^
' The scarcity rationale has been under attack since
many years, and its critics can be distinguished in a
factual part and a part of mere basic economic considera-
tion.
First of all, a number of facts in the technological
field of the telecomjnunications industry have occurred that
undermine the scarcity rationale. A proliferation of
broadcast signals this last decade provided an exponential
growth of cities capable of receiving multiple channels for
television and cable signals . (U.S. cable penetration has
been increasing rapidly for the past fev/ years up to 52,8 %
in 1988 : supra , note 175) Cable, low power and subscrip-
tion television, broadcast satellites, satellite m.aster
antenna systems, multipoint distribution services, tele-
text, videotext, and finally fiber optics created a
situation of abundance in the New Video Marketplace. (See
Stern and Krasnow , supra , note 171) Under these circums-
tances, the arguments in favor of equal First Amendm.ent
protection for the broadcast media have gained importance.
In the second place, one can argue that scarcity is a
general problem in econom.ic theory and that almost all
resources in the economic system are limited in amount, in
that people would like to use more than exists. The most
common way by which the American system allocates its
economic goods is through the price mechanism, leaving the
users without any need for government regulation. This
basic law of supply and demand has been applied to almost
all sectors of American industry. The main critique made in
the licence system set forth in the 19 3 4 Ccmjnunications Act
is that no property rights were created in these scarce
frequencies. (Coase, The Federal Communications Commission
,
2 J.L. & Econ. 1,14 (1959), at 12-40) Several proposals
have been formulated to submit the spectrum to the price
mechanism by leasing channels to the highest bidder,
following the theory of Adam Smith that the allocation of
resources should be determined by the forces of the market
rather than as a result of government decisions. ( See
Herzel, Public Interest and the Market in Color Television
Regulation , 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev., 802, 309 (1951) and
Smythe, Facing Facts about the Broadcast Business , 2 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 95 (1952) By stipulating that the grant of the
license was a privilege and vested no property interests in
the frequency or any guarantee that the license would be
renewed
, Congress comjnitted its "original electromagnetic
sin". ( Fowler and Brenner , supra , note 11 at 212) Instead
of being exchanged as a property right, exclusivity to a
radio frequency had to be assigned by the Comm.ission on
am.orphous standards such as the "public interest" and the
"public trustee" concept of a broadcaster. Abandoning a
marketplace approach in the determination of spectrum
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As noted above, the D.C. Court of Appeals rejected in
1977 the scarcity rationale for cable ^'^. Since the
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue in Preferred , the
issue remains unclear. Scarcity has always been criticized
-'-"^, but at this moment it still remains the cornerstone
for broadcasting regulation. It is a misconception to
present cable technology as unaffected by any scarcity. Its
channel capacity is limited, too ISO^ Furthermore, Red Lion
is still the law. In FCC v. League of Women Voters of
California -^^-^ the Supreme Court reaffirmed Red Lion by
disavowing any intention to "reconsider (its) longstanding
approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC that
technological developm.ents have advanced so far that som.e
revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be
required" 182^ This was affirmed by the D.C. Court of
Appeals in Telecommunications Research and Action Center v.
utilization created many tensions in both First Amendment
and economic terms, that have haunted communications policy
through its history.
178 Home Box Office v. FCC, supra, note 160.
179 M-|. j_2 ^ commonplace that almost all resources
used in the economic system are limited in amount and are
scarce, in that people would like to use more than exists."
Coase , supra , note 177 at 14.
^°^ See the discussion of the Quincy decision at Ch.
III. 3. a. and notes 231-251.
^31 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (hereinafter Women Voters )
132 i^, at 376 n. 11
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FCC ^^^, Meredith Corp. v. FCC ^^'^ and Branch v. FCC ^^^
,
although the judges clearly expressed their doubts about
the actual validity of the rationale. In Telecomiriunications
Research Center -^°° Judge Bork wrote: "the line drawn
between the print media and the broadcast media, resting as
it does on the physical scarcity of the latter, is a dis-
tinction without a difference. Employing the scarcity
rationale concept . . . inevitably leads to strained
reasoning and artificial resulrs" ^^'^ . He suggested that
"perhaps the Supreme Court will one day revisit this area
of the law and either eliminate the distinction betv/een
print and broadcast media, surely by pronouncing Tornillo
applicable to both, or announce a constitutional distinc-
tion that is m.ore usable than the present one" 188^ -p.^Q
weeks after Branch v. FCC , the Fairness Doctrine was
abandoned by the FCC. It was recognized that the roles of
183 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir.), reh
'
g denied 806 F.2d
863 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying political broadcast rules to
teletext)
184 809 F.2d 863, at 866-67 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 1987)
(opinion by C.J. Silberman) ( reaf f irm.ing the Fairness Doctrine)
185 824 F.2D 37, 49 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 19 87) (opinion
by C.J. Bork) (equal time rule applied to television news
reporter wishing to run for public office, and required
station which employed him to provide equal time to his
political opponents. Rule did not extinguish his right to
seek political office and was not unconstitutional)
186 Supra , note 183.
18*7 801 F2.d at 508. Bork also referred to Prof.
Cease's critique about spectrum scarcity. See note 179.
188 Id. at 509.
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the electronic and print media and the reasons for protec-
ting against governmental interference were identical-°^
.
Asserting that constitutional analysis should focus on
functional similarities rather than physical differences,
the Commission purported to afford broadcasters the same
First Amendment guaranties as print journalists 1^0. since
the Fairness Doctrine relied mainly upon the premise that
broadcasting was a uniquely scarce medium ^^^, the Commis-
sion's conclusion seems to indicate an abandonment of
scarcity as a rational for intervention. Maybe the Supreme
Court m.ay consider this "signal" to reformulate its opinion
in this matter.
^^^ Syracuse Peace Council , 57 R.R. 2d 519 (1984),
remanded sub nom. Meredith Corporation v. FCC
, 809 F.2d 863
(D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated by order of August 6, 1987, 2 FCC
Red 5042. At 5057 : "The First Amendment was adopted to
protect the people not from journalists, but from government."
^'^^ Lively
, supra , note 39, at 965.
^^^ Supra , note 82.
CHAPTER III
THE INVALIDATION OF THE MUST CARRY RULES
The must-carry rules formulated in 1965 required a
cable system to carry the signals, upon request and without
compensation, of all commercial television stations v.'ithin
3 5 miles of the community served by the system, other
stations in the same television market, and all stations
"significantly viewed in the comjnunity" . -^^^ The rules were
viewed by the Commission as "critical stones in the regula-
tory bulwark erected to guard against the destruction of
free, community oriented television" ^'^^ , Their rationale
was threefold: first, that cable television was a supple-
mentary service to, rather than a substitute for, broadcast
television service. Second, that mandatory carriage would
prevent "unfair" competition betv;een cable television and
local broadcast stations for audiences that the broadcast
stations were licensed to serve -54^ Third, that goals of
-^^'- Significant viewed stations were defined as out of
market: network affiliates obtaining at least 3 % of the
viewing hours in television homes in the community and
having a net weekly circulation of at least 25 % of
television homes. See Cable Television Report and Order 36
FCC 2d (1965) at 174.
^^^ Quincy Cable TV v. FCC 768 F.2d (1985) at 1441.
^^"^ Supra, note 103.
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diversity and localism could best be served by guaranteeing
a multitude of local outlets of self-expression ^^^.
The Supreme Court has addressed on several occasions
the breadth of the FCC ' s jurisdiction over cable ^5°, but
in marked contrast to the extensive First Amendment
jurisprudence developed in the broadcast media ^^ ' the
Court has never confronted a challenge to the constitutio-
nality of the must-carry rules 198^ j_^ l-^g lower courts,
the constitutional issue was raised very early but met
little success l^^. The courts most often treated cable and
broadcast television as indistinguishable for purposes of
First Amendm-ent analysis. In Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC
^^^ See Ch. I. 2. a. and notes 101-108.
15^ Quincy Cable v. FCC , 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir.
1985) at 1443 (declaring must-carry-rules unconstitution-
al), citing US v. Southwestern Cable Co. , 393 U.S. 157
(1968) at 178 (generally approving FCC jurisdiction over
cable if "reasonably ancillary" to its regulation of
broadcast television) Midwest I , 406 U.S. 649 (1972)
(finding rule requiring cable operator to originate local
programming within FCC ' s jurisdiction) Midv/est II , 440 U.S.
689 (1979) (striking down as beyond the FCC's jurisdiction
rules requiring cable operators to m.ake channels available
for local access)
-^^' See, e.g. , FCC v. League of Women Voters of
California 468 U.S. 364 (1984) and Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. V. FCC 395 U.S. 367 (1968), supra , ncres ISl and 30.
-'-^° In Midwest II , the Supreme Court described those
questions as "not frivolous" 440 U.S. at 709 n.l9. See also
Quincy , supra , note 196, at 1443 n.2Q.
-'-^^ Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC , 321
F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied 375 U.S. 951 (1962). See
supra
, note 98 and Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC 399 F.2d
25, at 69 (8th Cir. 1968)
.
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2^'^, the only court decision prior to Quincy having
explicitly considered the constitutionality of the .T.ust-
carry rules, the eight Circuit judged it "irrelevant that
the CATV systems do not themselves use the air v;aves in
their distribution systems." ^'^'^ The Court relied on
Southwestern Cable 202 ^^^ N3C v. US 203 ^o hold that the
public interest standard permitted curtailing of the First
Amendment, whether it be for broadcasting or cable.
This holding was rejected in 1977 by the D.C. Court
of Appeals in Home Box Office v. FCC 204^ This case can be
considered as the beginning of a change in attitude of the
courts toward cable and its First Ajr.endment rights '-^-'. The
rejection of the scarcity rationale by part of the judici-
ary was later followed by a deregulation v;ave by the
Reagan-administration 206 _ These events prepared a favora-
ble climate for an industry that had passed into its stage
of maturity and growing free speech av;areness. The strong
200 399 p^2d 25 (8th Cir. 1968) (hereinafter Black
Hills )
201 id^ at 69.
202 Supra , note 109.
203 Supra , note 26.
204 567 F.2d 9,45 (D.C. Cir. 1977, per curiam ) cert,
denied 434 U.S. 829 (1977) The Court rejected Black Hills
because one of its premises for regulation, scarcity, v/as
held not to exist for cable activities. See supra , note 161
205 See Ch. II. I.e. and notes 160-165.
206 Supra , note 3.
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affirmation of cable's First Amendinent rights in the Ninth
Circuits opinion for Preferred Corrjr.unications v. City of
Los Angeles 207^ shortly before Quincy reached the bench,
has undoubtly boosted this evolution.
1) The Quincy Cable Decision
In Quincy Cable TV, v. FCC ^^^ the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
struck down the FCC's must-carry rules as an unconstitu-
tional infringement on the First Am.endm.ent rights cf cable
operators. Circuit Judge Skelly Wright held the rules
constitutionally infirm because the Comjnissicn had failed
to demonstrate a governmental interest sufficient to
justify infringement of cable operator's First Ajnendm.ent
rights, and even assuming a showing of such an interest,
that the rules, as presently drafted and applied, v/ere not
properly tailored to attain the governm.ent ' s purpose in
promulgating them 209^ r^^ie court determined the appropriate
207 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985 )( hereinafter Prefer-
red ) aff'd on narrower grounds 476 U.S. 4S8 (1986, i.e.
after Quincy )
208 768 p^2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985) cert, denied sub
nom. National Association of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cabl^
TV, Inc. 476 U.S. 1169 (1986) (hereinafter Quincy )
209 pq2^ comments on Quincy see Gregory, supra , note
125, Wiesenthal, The Must Carry Rules After Quincy Cable
TV, Inc. V. FCC : The Attempt To Harmonize Mandatory
Carriage With Freedom Of Speech , 3 8 Syracuse L.Rev. No. 2,
745-773 (Summer 1937) and Gaffney, Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v
FCC : Judicial Deregulation Of Cable TV Via The First
Amendment, 20 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 11SQ-12Q2 (Winter 1986).
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standard of First Amendment reviev; tc apply to must carry
rules by evaluating two ccnsideraticns
.
a) Inapplicability of the Scarcity Rationale
First the court considered whether the First Am.end-
ment principles governing regulation of the broadcast media
should also apply to regulation of cable television.
Referring to its previous decision in Hom.e Box Office 210^
the Court considered the scarcity rationale not applicable
in an evaluation of government regulation of cable televis-
ion , and held that "there is no m.eaningful distinction
between cable television and nev;spapers" ^^^. The Court
refused to consider the natural m.onopoly situation of the
cable operator, calling this issue a problem, of "econom.ic
scarcity" 213 214_
210 567 F.2d 9 (1977) C.J. Skelly Wright also presided
this bench. See Ch. II. I.e. and notes 160-165.
2H In light of cable's virtual-
ly unlimited channel capaci-
ty, the standard of First
Amendment review reserved
for occupants of the
physically scarce airwaves
is plainly inapplicable.
Quincy , 768 F.2d at 1450.
212 Id.
2-'-3 The court referred to the econom.ic scarcity
problem as parallel to that for nev.'spapers and rem.inded
that the Suprem.e Court has categorically rejected
the suggestion that purely econom.ic constraints
on the number of voices available in a given
community justify otherwise unv.'arranted
intrusion into First Amendm.ent rights.
Id. , citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. 247-256 ('l974).
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b. Application of the O'Brien test
Ir. a second step, the Court considered v/hether the
must carry rules merited treatment as an "incidental burden
on speech" subject to analysis under the balancing test of
United States v. O'Brien ^15^ -phe O'Brien test is usually
reserved for governmental regulations that affect a m.ixture
of speech and non-speech or conduct, and therefore only
incidentally burden speech. Under the test, a regulation
will be sustained if 1) the rules serve a substantial
governmental interest and 2) the intrusion is no greater
than is essential 216^ rj^j^^ Court did not exclude that an
even more stringent test could be applied, similar to that
in Tornillo . But it concluded that it needed not to do so
since even under O ' Brien , the rules v.'ere im.perm.issible ^^^'.
1 . No Proof of a Substantial Governm.ental Interest
The Court found it unnecessary to determ.ine v.'hether
the must carry rules upheld a substantial governjr.ental
interest. It agreed with the plaintiffs that the very
premises on which the rules v/ere grounded had been repudia-
ted by the FCC upon its deregulation of the syndicated
^^^ In Ch. V. the thesis will examine the issue of
cable's natural monopoly.
215 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See also note 135.
^'^ Quincy , at 1451. See alsc Hom.e Box Office 567 F.2d
9 (1977) at 48.
21'7 Quincy , at 1454
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exclusivity rules 218^ r^^ie threat of cable television to
traditional broadcasters v.'as not e"idenced by a factual
support 219 _ ^j-^^;^ "the mere assertion cf a substantial
governmental interest standing alone, is insufficient to
justify subordination of First Amendment freedom.s ^20 _
2 . Incongruence between Means and Ends
Second, the must carry rules failed to fulfill the
second O'Brien requirement of causing as little intrusion
as possible. The rules indiscrim.inately protected each
broadcaster regardless of the quantity of local service
available in the community, and irrespective of duplicative
programming 221^ jf must carry were to preserve localism.,
the Court found that the rules, as they v/ere actually
written, were "grossly" overinclusive 222^ j^ ^j_^ j-^q+-
exclude that a less intrusive version of the rules v.'ould
pass the constitutional test, provided that they v.'ere
21S wiesenthal , supra , note 209, at 764.
21^ See : Economic Inquiry Report , supra , note 209, at
661 : "upon examination of the econom.ic evidence, v;e
conclude that competition of cable television dees not pose
a significant threat to conventional television or to our
overall broadcasting policies."
220 Quincy at 1454
221 Id. at 1461
222 Id. at 1460
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sufficiently supported by a factual record. Gnly in the
current form, they could no longer stand ^^^.
2 ) The Century Coinmunications Decision
In August 1986 the FCC announced a plan providing for
a transitional period of mandatory carriage regulation that
would ultimately lead to the dissolution of m.andatory
carriage entirely 224^ rj^j^^ plan was a response to a
compromise negotiated between the several broadcast and
cable trade associations 22o^ Under the new rules, the
number of television signals which a cable system, m.ust
carry increased according to the system. 's capacity. This
less intrusive regulation would expire after a period of
five years 226^ Next, cable operators were required to
install an A/B switch for new subscribers at no additional
cost. Such a switch would enable a viev.'er to sv;itch easily
223 Id. at 1463
224 51 Fed. Reg. 44.608 and Wiesenthal , supra , note
209, at 769.
^25 See The Ayes Have It On Must Carry , Broadcasting,
July 21, 1986 at 31 and Brotm.an, The Curious Case Of The
Must-Carry Rules : Breaking The Endless Policy Loop Through
Negotiated Rulemaking , 40 Fed. Comm. L.J. No. 3 399-412
(May 1988)
.
226 Such prepared dissolution is referred to as a
"sunset Drovision".
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back and forth between cable and off-air television signals
227^
Again, the D.C. Court of Appeals struck dov/n these
rules for lack of factual support evidencing the need for
must carry and the usefulness of the sunset provision:
Century Communications, v. FCC (1987) ^28^ mj^^ Court did
not accept the "sound predictive judgment" of the Commis-
sion that it will take about five years for cons'umers to
learn about the switch-and-antenna m.echanism. and thus that
a five-year transition period is needed during v/hich the
agency will provide consum.er education 229^ Judge Wald,
however, stressed that must carry v;as not per se uncon-
stitutional, but that the goverr-ment m.ust be able to adduce
either empirical support or at least sound reasoning on
behalf of its measures 230 _ jj^ other words, the Commission
could feel free to redraft the rules un a v/ay that v.'ould
satisfy the Courts requirem.ents under the ' Brien test.
227 Cable operators argued that such a sv/itch v/ould
solve the problem of local broadcast reception. Quincy , at
1441. The switch is also significant in defining relevant
product markets. See infra , note 3 43.
228 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987 )( hereinafter Century )
Order for Clarification 837 F.2d 517 (upholding the
requirements concerning A/B switches and consum.er educa-
tion.) C.J. Wald delivered this opinion for the Court.
229 Century
, 835 F.2d at 304
230 Id
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3) Critique
a) Misconception About The Scarcity Rationale
The two opinions of the D.C. Court of Appeals favor a
strong First Amendment protection for cable operators,
distinguishing them from broadcasters on the absence of any
spectrum scarcity. However, the Court repeatedly comjr.ented
that the must carry rules burdened operators because they
displaced programming that v/ould otherv.'ise be carried on
the channels occupied by required local stations '^^^.
Scarcity is clearly also affecting the cable medi'-im:
despite the widely held notion that cable systems have a
virtually unlimited channel capacity, 3S,7 % of suoh
systems had fewer than 20 channels in 19S4 232^ Distin-
guishing cable and broadcast for this reason alone v;ould
thus be insufficient.
b) Premature Full First Amendment Protection For Cable
The extent of First Amendment protection for cable
seemed clearly established for the Quincy Court 233^
However, the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue
since it still "must determine v/hether the characteristics
231 Quincy , 768 F.2d at 1451-52, 1453, 1461. Gaffney,
supra
, note 209, at 1199.
232 Quincy at 1439 n. 9, citing Television and Cable
Factbook, Cable Services Volum.e at 1726 (19S4)
23-^ Quincy at 1444, referring to the lov.'er Court
decision in Preferred, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 19S5). See
note 207.
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of cable television make it sufficiently analogous to
another medium to warrant application of an already
existing standard or whether these characteristics require
a new analysis ^^'^. The v/ay in which C.J. Wright granted
cable such a broad First Am.endment right may thus be
called, for the least to say, prem.ature.
c) Disregarding The FCC's Goals Of Diversity And Localism
As set out in the previous chapters, the Suprem.e
Court recognized that goals of diversity and localism
justified regulation of the broadcast industry 235^ There
is no reason to disregard these goals v.'ith respect to cable
television, since Congress enacted the 19S4 Cable Policy
Act as an integral part of the Cominunications Act and these
goals have been expressly codified for cable in Sec. 521
( 4 ) and ( 6 ) .
Absent the scarcity factor, preservation of the
"marketplace of ideas" is still as fundam.ental as the
protection of free speech. And the right to free speech
does not embrace the right to snuff out the free speech of
others 236^ rj^j^^ goal of promoting localism m.ust be served
irrespective of the use of the air waves or the coaxial
cable. It is important to distinguish at this point betv/een
Preferred
, 476 U.S. at 497 (Justice Blackm.un, concurrii
22^ See Chapter I and notes 50-95.
22^ Associated Press v. United States 3 26 U.S. at 20,
quoted in Red Lion 395 U.S. at 392}
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cable programmers, v/ho exercise undcubtly an editorial
discretion similar to that of other media, and cable
operators, who deliver the program.s to the public and enjoy
a situation of local monopoly '^^'. The Quincy Court refused
categorically to address this issue, rejecting as "doubt-
ful" and "unproven" the "assumption that cable operators
are in a position to exact m.onopolistic charges" 238 _ j_^
favoring the cable operators First Am.endm.ent claim, the
D.C. Court of Appeals did not so much deprive local
broadcasters from their right to be heard as it did for the
local viewers from their right for the widest dissem.ination
of ideas possible. It is still the right of the viev/ers and
listeners which is paramount '^^^ , regardless whether they
be served by use of the air waves, cable or other carriers.
The FCC, over the past years, has reversed this
balance in favor of the industry itself. This m.ajor shift
in interests has colored the v;hole deregulatory process of
the past two Administrations, and v;as not lim.ited to the
telecommunications sector 240^ 3q £^j- >^Yie Supreme Court has
nowhere indicated that it would tclerate subordination of
the public's interest to that of industry. This v;culd
237 See Ch. V. and notes 284-319.
228 Quincy , at 1450. See Ch. V.l.d. and note 290 for
comments on the rising subscribers fee charges in cable.
239 Red Lion 395 U.S. at 390
2"^^ In this respect, a parallel with the aviation and
telephone sector would reveal many interesting aspects.
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contravene the very basic principle of the First Annendment
241,
d) Diversity As A Substantial Govermr.ental Interest
Promoting diversity is a legiti.Tiate goal recognized
by the Supreme Court in its rulings concerning chain-
broadcasting rules, multiple ov/nership rules, and crossov.'-
nership rules 242, j^ ^^^ certainly be considered as a
substantial governrnental interest as required under the
O' Brien test, and has been done so by at least one federal
court 243, 'j<j-^g lack of factual support does not necessarily
undermine the legitimacy of this interest. As the D.C.
Court of Appeals observed in 197S, "diversity and its
effects are elusive concepts, not easily defined let alone
measured without making qualitative judgments objectionable
on both policy and First Amendment grounds" 244, j^ ^-^q
circumstances at bar before the National Citizens case, the
2"^^ Z. Chafee, Government and Mass ComjT!unication , 546
(1947)
.
242 See respectively NBC v. U.S. 319 U.S. 190 (1943),
U.S. V. Storer Broadcasting Co. 351 U.S. 192 (1956) and FCC
V. Nat. Cit. Comm. for Broadcasting 436 U.S. 77 5 (197S) and
supra, notes 26,61 and 49.
243 New York Citizens Committee on Cable T^/ v,
Manhattan Cable TV, Inc. , 651 F.Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 19S6),
recognizing promotion of com.petition am.ong cable operators
as an substantial governm.ental interest. See infra Ch.
VI. 3. b. and notes 358-367.
^^^ FCC V. National Citizens Committee for Broadcas-
ters , 555 F.2d 938 (1977) at 961, aff 'd 436 U.S. at 797
(hereinafter National Citizens). See also note 49.
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Court found the Commission entitled to "rely on its
judgment, based on experience, that true diversity from a
commonly owned station-nev.'spaper combination v.'ould be
unrealistic" 2'^-'. To the same extent, the Commission could
have defended the must carry rules on its sound judgm.ent
that without assuring local broadcasters to be carried on
the nearby cable system, its legitim.ate goals of localism,
and diversity were unlikely to be safeguarded. Such
arguments would have served the interest of the viev.'ing
public. Instead, the Comjnission choose to serve the broad-
casters interest: it focused its defense of the rules only
on the economic disadvantages of cable's growth for local
broadcasters, atte.mpting to protect the latter against
fierce competition. Although the Quincy opinion initially
refers to the FCC ' s concern to "channel the grcwth of cable
in a manner consistent with the public's interest in the
preservation of local broadcasting" 246^ j_^ narrows the
issue to a pure competitive problem betv;een cable and
broadcasters. Given the Commission's past policy of
deregulation and encouraging competition, a defeat of its
arguments was foreseeable ^^^ .
245 id^
246 Quincy at 1442
24/ Neither exhausted the FCC its efforts to save the
rules after the Quincy decision was delivered: absent any
action taken on its behalf, the v.'rit for certiorari had to
be filed by the National Association for Broadcasters. See
FCC won't appeal Must Carry Ruling
,
Cablevision Aug. 12,
1986
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e) Must Carry Is Structural Rather Than Content-Affecting
In Quincy , the Court referred to the FCC's Eccncm.ic
Inquiry Report admitting the lack of evidence to justify
the syndex and distant signal rules 243 _ However, the
parallel which the Court drew with must carry disregards
the different nature of these rules and the extent to v.'hich
they interfere with the editorial discretion of the cahle
operator.
As noted above 249^ must carry can be classified as a
speech-neutral regulation, in that it does not interfere
within the content of the program., as did the distant
signal rule for instance. Must carry rather attem.pts to
regulate the structural relationship betv;een cable and
broadcasters in an effort to promote its statutory goals.
In this respect, it should be analyzed under the sam.e
standard as applied to the rules preventing concentration
of media-ownership. There the standard is found in the
public interest, convenience and necessity, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in National Citizens : "so long as (the
rules) are not an unreasonable m.eans for seeking (their)
goals", they are permissible within the general rulem.aking
authority recognized in the Storer Broadcasting and NBC
cases 250^
2'^8 Supra , note 219.
249 See Ch. I.l.d and notes 63-72.
250 436 U.S. at 796
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The First Amendment challenge in National Citizens
was rejected by referring to tne scarcity rationale. Since
scarcity still exists fcr cable ^-'-^, there is no reason to
exclude this reasoning in chis .T.atter. As long as the
Supreme Court has net defined a proper First Ajr.endment
standard for cable, the public interest standard of the
Communications Act applies to both in the same v/ay. If a
distinction were found, the Court should recognize that
promotion of diversity rem.ains a factor of public policy
notwithstanding absence of scarcity.
4) Most Recent Developments
In January 1989, a Bill was introduced in Congress to
reimpose must carry via the Copyright Act 252^ -pj^g Bill,
referred to as nhe Cable Compulsorv License Non-Discrimi-
nation Act of 1989 , would amend Section 111 of the Copy-
right Law to provide compulsory licenses only to those
cable service providers who provide adequate carriage of
local broadcast signals. Additionally, the Bill proposes a
halt to the practice of som.e cable systems whereby som.e
local stations are moved from long held cable channels and
251 Supra , note 232.
252 H.R. 109 IClst Congress, 1st Session, January 3,
1989 (introduced by Mr. Bryant)
S. 177 101st Congress, 1st Session, January 25, 1939
(introduced by Mr. DeConcini, Metzenbaum., Sim.on and Pressler)
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assigned different and undesirable channel numbers 2^-^.
Operators would remain free to decide v/hether or net they
will carry local stations on their system. They could then
negotiate individually with them for the right to retrans-
mit their signals.
By linking must carry with the Copyright Act,
Congress will avoid the First Ajnendm.ent challenge. The
Copyright Clause of the Constitution grants Congress pov.'er
to secure copyright to authors for a lim.ited tim.e, if their
purpose is to promote the progress of science -^^'4. Although
this was obviously not the intent of the drafters, the Bill
could demonstrate how the Copyright Clause, as a lim.ited
grant of monopoly, can be reconciled to som.e extent v;ith
the purposes of the First .^-m.endm.ent '^^^.
In proposing this Bill, an opportunity was m.issed to affirm.
a right of the public to receive local and diversified
programming. Instead, the Bill focuses on the balancing of
the interests of cable and broadcasting industry 256^
Critiques of this "must-carry rider" argue for strong
^-'^ This practice is known in the industry as channel-
shifting .
2^"^ U.S. Const, art. I, Sec. 8, cl. S
^-'^ The Copyright Clause lim.its Congress' pov.'er to
grant copyright protection because it contains free speech
constraints. See Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair
Use , 40 Vand. L. Rev., 1-63 (19S7)
256 »ij|- j_3 imperative that Congress address this issue
to ensure that equity and balance are restored both to the
law and to the overall econom.ic relationship betv/een the
two industries." Sen. Congress. Rec
.
S 535 (January 25, 1939)
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judicial skepticism against this proposal, depicted as an
"FCC-imposed illegal surrogate for ille'-,..-i 1 l£S/-»a"^ r^ r^ T- i~ e^ r> *~ r^/^n-*-v-/^, "i **
257
The effect of the decisions is object of contradic-
tory reporting: according to comments filed by public
broadcasters in an FCC inquiry, 74 public television
stations have been verifiably dropped by cable operators
and have not been reinstated. And of the nation's 315
independent stations as of July 19SS, out of v.'hich 160 were
surveyed by the Association of Independent Television
Stations, about 40 have been dropped or refused carriage by
cable operators, or shifted to less desirable channel
positions 258^ r^-^^ threat for discontinued carriage is
biggest for public stations and independent television.
2^"^ Paul Glist, Cable Must Carry Again 3 9 Fed. Corrjr..
L.J. No. 1-2 109-121 (May 1987) (making a parallel v;ith the
invalidation of the "family viev;ing hour policy" of the FCC
in Writers Guild of America v. FCC 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979)
Zoo pifank Lovece, Muddling Through The Must-Carry
Mess , Channels, September 1988, 49 (citing House Testim.o-
ny) . But com.pare with NCTA Study Shov;s Cable Carrying Most
Stations , Broadcasting, Sept. 19, 19SS, at 59-60 and Real-
World Data On A Post-Must-Carry-World
,
Broadcasting, Sept.
5, 1988, at 1.
PART II
ANTITRUST AS AI/TERNATIVE FOR CABLE REGULATION
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INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters v.'e have described hew the
must-carry rules developed, what their justifications v.'ere
and how they have been invalidated by the D.C. Court of
Appeals. The Ouincy and Century decisions gave cable
operators a wide power of discretion as to whether or not
they should carry a local broadcaster cr, their system. This
power can be considered as an equitable exercise of cable's
First Amendment rights ^^^ . It can also be considered, in
some cases, as the pov;er to decide about the comjnercial
viability of the local broadcaster. With a grov/ing cable
penetration am.ong the TV-watching households, m.ore and more
broadcasters become dependent on the cable carriage to
reach their audiences 260^ Absent any governmental inter-
vention, other legal means can be found to prevent the
2^^ The extent of these rights remains unclear,
however, as a result of the Suprem.e Courts cautious ruling
in the Preferred case. Supra , note 169.
250 rpl-^Q p^jf^ switch, as imposed under the unaffected
portion of the revised must-carry rules, would only heal
the situation where a traditional antenna v/as still
available. In many urban areas, over-the-air reception of
broadcast signals is very difficult, if not im>possible, so
that the dependence on a cable svstem. is even enhanced.
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cable operators' discretion from grov/ir.g our into an abuse
of its position -^-.
The antitrust laws seem fit to deal v.'ith such a
situation, and many commentators favoring the deregulation
process have proposed antitrust enforcement as the appro-
priate alternative for regulatory control 262^ r^y^^ anti-
trust laws are particulary v;ell suited to elim.inate
monopoly restraints in media markets because their enforce-
ment is aimed at allowing the forces of competition to
perform the regulatory function. They provide a structural
approach to diversity in ov/nership of broadcasting cutlers
without interfering with their content '^^^ . Private anti-
trust suits enable aggrieved parties to enforce their
ricrhts therebv obviatin'~' the need for detailed '^overnm.ent
intervention in First Amendment processes 264^
This part of the thesis will analyze possible
antitrust claims against cable operators for refusal to
carry local signals 26d^ j^. ^i]_]_ conclude that the nature
261 This position, as will be explained further, is in
most cases that of a natural monopoly. See infra , note 2S4.
See, e.g. , Rosen, Media Cross-Ov;nership , Effective
Enforcement Of Antitrust Laws, And The FCC , 3 2 Fed. Ccm-m
.
L.J. No. 1, 105-147 (Winter 1981)
2°3 Id. at 105. For a definition of "speech-neutral"
regulation see supra , Ch. I.l.d.
26^ Supra , note 145, at 585.
2°^ We will focus our attention on the relation
broadcaster-cable operator or the relation cable operator-
viewing public. Therefore, the com.plex process betv.'een the
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of antitrust itself and the special position occupied by
cable operators as a natural ir.cncpoly cannot resolve the
issue satisfactorily. In the first place, the goals of
diversity and local programming are difficult to translate
into antitrust vocabulary. In the second place, antitrust
is aimed at achieving the conditions of a com.petitive
market. In contrast to regulation, it is not designed to
replicate the results of competition or to correct inherent
structural defects such as natural monopoly 2c5_
However, this is not to say that the antitrust lav.'s have no
relarionship at all with diversity: in the next chapter, v.'e
will demonstrate how the goals of antitrust and the First
Amendment can be reconciliated.
cable operator and the franchising city authority v/ill only
be referred to summarily. Neither will the article deal
with other issues of cable as natural m.onopoly, such as
price-regulation.
at 17.
^^^ Regulated Industries
, West Nutschell Series, 19S2,
CHAPTER IV
CONGRUENT GOALS OF ANTITRUST AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The goal of the antitrust laws is to prohibit ocnduot
which directly or indirectly forecloses entry into and
competition within any type of econoinic market ^^ ' 268^
Such foreclosure can occur through com.bined practices am.ong
competitors or through the existence of a m.onopoly. The
more the number of participants in a m.arket is limited, the
more such foreclosure is likely to occur. The antitrust
laws combate monopolies and practices in restraint of trade
because their existence is assum.ed to lead to less effi-
ciency and higher prices paid by the consum.er. In this
respect, we can say that the antitrust lav.'s are designed to
preserve a kind of "econom.ic diversity", v/ith the consumers
as ultimate beneficiaries. They prom.cte the control of
private economic power through competition just as diversi-
ty of media ownership encourages the presentation of varied
viewpoints. A parallel with the values consacred in the
First Amendment becomes therefore obvious.
2°' Botein, Jurisdictional And Antitrust Considera-
tions In The Regulation Of The Nev; Communications Techno-
logies
, 25 N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 863, 872-73 (1930), at 879.
9 C Q
^co pq-j^ ^ definition of such a m.arket, see infra , Ch.
VI. and notes 338-349,
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1) Associated Press v. United States
In Associated Press v. United States ^°^ the Supreme
Court stressed the congruent goals of antitrust and the
First Amendment: "That: Ajnendment rests on the assumption
that the widest possible dissemination of inform.ation from,
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public" 270^ j^ Black affirmed that applica-
tion of the Sherman Act could further the goals of the
First Amendment:
A command that the government shall not im.pede
the free flow of ideas does not afford a non-
governmental combination a refuge if it im.poses
restraints upon that constitutionally guaran-
teed freedom . . . Freedom, of the press from,
governmental interference under the First
Am.endment does not sanction repression of that
freedom by private interests. The First
Amendment affords not the slightest support for
the contention that a combination to restrain
trade in news and views has any constitutional
immunity" 2'^-'-.
The Sherman Act covers all industry practices, whether
they are medium-related or not: "the fact that the publis-
her handles news while others handle goods does not . .
.
2^9 326 U.S. 1 (1945)
270 Id. at 20
^'^ Id. The Justice Department had brought suit under
the Sherman Act to get an injunction v;hich v.'ould prevent
the Associated Press from continuing to operate under som.e
of its by-lav/s. These by-laws prevented AP members from
selling news to non-members. Other by-lav; provisions also
gave a newspaper which had an AP membership virtual veto
power over competing nev;spapers ' attempts to get AP m.em.ber-
ship. AP contended inter alia that such an injunction v/ould
interfere with its First Ajnend.ment rights.
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afford the publisher a peculiar constitutional sanctuary in
which he can with impunity violate lav;s regulating his
business practices" ^'^ 273^
2) Diversity Through A Marketplace Of Ideas
These holdings have often been reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in its attempts to justify government
regulation of broadcasting. They affirm, that the First
Amendment does not only confer rights to individuals, but
also imposes an affirmative duty on gcvernm.ent or on others
to protect those rights. In broadcasting, that duty became
even more important since the number of voices available
2'^ Black v;rote for a sharply divided Court.
J. Roberts, dissenting, alleged that the Court's opinion
"under the guise of enforcing the Sherm.an Act, in fact
renders AP a public utility subject to the duty to serve
all on equal terms" Id. at 45. He criticized heavily the
Court's regulation of ownership of news, referring to the
regulatory scheme Congress had developed v;ith respect to
the use of the radio air v.'aves :
In that field Congress has im.posed regulation
because, in contrast to the press, the physical
channels of communication are limited, and chaos
would result from unrestrained and unregulated
use of such channels. But in imposing regula-
tion. Congress has refrained from, any restraint
on ownership of news or inform.ation or the right
to use it. And any regulation of this m.ajor
source of information, in the light of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech, should
be closely and jealously examined by the courts.
Id. at 48 (Roberts, J., dissenting)
^'•^ Antitrust litigation in the motion picture distri-
bution did not raise First Amendm.ent problem.s : the
anticompetitive practices of theatre ov.'ners and film,
distributors were so antitrust related that the First
Amendment problem was considered as "rem.ote" . See United
States V. Paramount Pictures 334 U.S. at 167.
was limited: "the right of free speech for broadcasters
does not embrace the right to snuff out the free speech of
others" '^''^. A multiplicity of voices v/ould create an
"uninhibited marketplace of ideas", in which truth v/ill
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance m.onopoliza-
tion of that market" 275^ -pQ protect that market, it
requires regulation, just as a free m.arket for goods needs
law against m.onopoly. Such regulation m.ight require
"essential facilities accessible to all, m.ethods to assure
that communication channels remain open, and m.easures
directed at particular communication industries, intended
to promote freedom and to make them perform, their proper
function in a free society 275^ rj^j^^ concept of the "market-
place of ideas" was developed by the English philosophers
Milton and Mills in the eighteenth century, and first re-
cognized by Justice Holmes in Abram.s v. United States :
...the best test of truth is the pov/er of the
thought to get itself accepted in the ccm.peti-
tion of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried cut. That at any time is the theory of
our Constitution. It is an experim.ent, as all
life is an experiment 277^
It also prevailed in upholding the FCC ' s crossovmership
2'"* Red Lion 295 U.S. at 365, quoting Associated Press
2'75 ia_^ at 390
2"^^ Chafee , supra , note 241, at 471. See also Frank-
lin , supra , note 22, at 19.
277 250 U.S. 616 (1919) at 630 (C.J. Holmes, dissenting)
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rules 2"^^ and cable local prograiruning rules 279^ r^^ie FCC ' s
policy aimed at promoting localism through a m.ultiplicity
of broadcasting outlets was inspired by this idea. The
must-carry rules, too often only defended as protectionist
m.easures , were also "predicated upon the social desirabil-
ity of having a large number of local outlets v;ith diversi-
ty of control over dissem.inating sources rather than a few
stations serving vast areas of population" 280
_
The 1984 Cable Policy Act contains so-called leased
access provisions, which require that cable system.s set
aside a percentage of channels for use by unaffiliated
programmers 281^ j^-^ addition, the Act clearly intends to
promote competition and diversity 232^ rn-^^ cable industry,
however, shows some particular characteristics v.'hich m.ake
competition in the marketplace unlikely, and requires
278 See Memorandum Opinion and Order 47 FCC 2d 97
(1974) at 1048 (explaining that the prospective ban on
creation of co-located newspaper-broadcast com.binations v.'as
grounded primarily in First Ajnendm.ent concerns, while the
divestiture regulations were based on both First Am.endm.ent
and antitrust policies.) and National Citizens
, supra , note
49, 436 U.S. at 775.
279 See Midwest I 406 U.S. 649, 667-669 and n. 27
(1972) (plurality opinion)
280 First Report and Order 3 8 FCC at 700(196 5)
(promulgating must-carry and netv.'ork nonduplication rules
,
quoting Associated Press v. United States )
281 47 u.S.C.A. § 532. See also Ch. I.2.C. and notes
127-128.
282 See Ch. I and notes 58-97.
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therefore a higher degree of regulation necessary to secure
diversity 283^
'^^ For a discussion of the marketplace ^^ ^^'^J-^ — WW J-i.* W..W w.-^.
TnrrKof TViia M a >-V o t- _Court's First Amendment doctrine, see Ingber
place of Ideas : A Legitimizing Myth 1 9 S 4 Duke L .
J
CHAPTER V
CABLE AS A NATURAL MONOPOLY
Determining the degree of competition in a. market is
the first essential step in evaluating the application of
antitrust laws. In the cable television market, com.petition
in the same geographical area is alm.ost inexistent 234^ r^^ie
economic and physical nature of the industry tends to
exclude other potential competitors. This situation m.akes
cable being described sometim.es as a natural m.onopoly.
In the ideal market, where "perfect" com.petition
occurs, buyers and sellers are so num.crous that no one of
them is capable of affecting the m.arket through his conduct
^°~>
. In addition, the model of perfect com.petition assum.es
that producers will bear the sam.e production cost per unit
284 There are only about three dozens of overbuilds
out of approximatively 7.000 cable system.s in the country.
See Kahn, How Safe Is Cable's Natural Monopoly ? , Cablevis-
ion, Oct. 13, 1986, at 16. See also Brenner and Price
,
supra , note 68, at 3-55
'^°-' In a competitive market, customers v;ill differen-
tiate between sellers basing their judgments on price. If
each product is a ready substitute for all others, and if
there is no shortage of alternative suppliers, a price
increase by one firm will prompt its custom.ers to purchase
from that firm's rivals. The willingness of the buyers to
shift to other suppliers in reaction to price increases is
described as the "elasticity of dem.and" : the m.ore the
products are alike, the higher is their interchangeability
and the higher their degree of elasticity. Gregory , supra ,
note 125, at 614.
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over all practical rates of production. These "constant
returns to scale" put a limit on the physical ability of
the producer to increase his output. Such "perfect"
competition is seldom, and m.ost m.arkets vary in a scale
going from a "working" com.petition to a m.onopoly situation.
The opposite side of this m.arket theory is that of
the natural monopoly. Such a monopoly is likely to occur in
a market with such inherent structural and physical
characteristics that the producers price and production
efficiency is maxiraalized only in the absence of any
competition 28b ^ According to the theory, natural monopo-
lies exhibit the tendency tov/ard decreasing unit costs as
more output is concentrated in a single supplier. These
decreasing unit costs or "econom.ies of scale" undermine the
perfect competition model since they cause disappearance of
other competitors: since it is cheaper, per unit, for one
firm to produce enough for all of the market's dem.and, any
other firm producing a smaller amount v/ould face higher
costs per unit 287^
2S6 John Stuart Mill On Natural Monopolies (1S48) v;as
the first economist to write about this concept. Mill drev;
upon his observations of the competitive m.arket for gas and
water supply in London, suggesting that significant
economies would result from the existence of only one firm.
in the market that could charge lov;er prices while reali-
zing the same profit rates. See also W. Shakey, The Theory
of Natural Monopoly
, 14 (1981).
90-7
"•°' H, Haverkamp : Economics an Federal Antitrust
Laws, 31 (1985)
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Scholars debate over whether or not cable syste.T.s
should be considered as a natural mcncpoly ^88^ r^Yie
question is far from academic since the position taken in
this issue determines largely the degree of justification
for governiTental regulation of cable television. The Q'uincy
decision, after finding that the cable-as-natural-moncpoly
theory was "entirely unproven and indeed doubtful" ^°^
illustrates the important consequences of such a determi-
nation. The increasing rates in cable subscription fees
give at least some support for challenging the theory that
cable systems operate in a fully competitive environ-
ment 290 291.
1 ) Elements Favoring the Natural Monopoly Approach
The follov/ing elements argue in favor of defining
cable television as a natural m.onopoly:
288
^^ Posner, Cable Television: The Problem. Of Local
Monopoly (1970). A. Kahn, The Sconom.ics Of Regulation
(1971). Gregory , supra , note 125.
Contra , Lee, Cable Franchising And The First Am.end-
ment, 36 Vand. L. Rev. No. 4, 867-92S (May 1983)
289 Supra , note 213
290 Rates for basic cable services have risen 20 % in
1987 and 10 % in 1988: Setting Cable Free : Did Congress
Unleash A Monster ? , Business Week, June 5, 1989, at 135,
and the Arthur Anderson Report of 1987 : si.x m.onths after
deregulation, average subscribers' m.onthly bill has
increased with 6,7 % Wall Street Journal, Nov. 24, 19 87, at
5.
See also Commerce Dpt. Believes Cable Television
Needs More Competition To Avoid Monopolistic Pracrices
,
Cable Television, July 1, 1988, at 1.
89
a) Cable television is a decreasing cost industry ;
average costs decrease steadily as the operator's invest-
ment and operating costs are spread over a greater number
of subscribers. Significant economies of scale appear for
both basic and pay cable subscriptions: this decreasing
cost curve of cable operations m.akes a m.onopoly m.ore
likely.
b) Every potential competition is likely to be destructive
cable's marginal cost curve ^^^ is much lower than the
average cost curve so that competition betv.'een cable
operators will prove very costly, v/ith neither of them
capable of realizing their costs 293^ gQ ^^le construction
of "overbuilds" is commercially inviable. This argum.ent is
contested on the grounds that the absence of overbuilds in
most areas is a consequence of the m.unicipal franchising
process rather than economics of the industry ^^4^
c) There is no significant substitution for cable televi-
sion service : the new "real-tim.e" video delivery system.s
(DBS, SMATV, LPTV) offer no realistic alternative to the
much more developed, multi-channel service of cable
2°2 The marginal cost is defined as the cost to
produce one additional product. The average cost is defined
as the total costs divided by the total number of products.
^^^ Gregory , supra , note 125, referring to m.ultiple
case-studies on the subject.
294 Lee , supra , note 288 at 880-81
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television. The price for their services is still toe high
to compete effectively and they dc not, as a consequence,
compete in the same markets. In addition, cable's higher
picture quality and channel capacity makes it not com.pe-
ting, for viewers purposes, in the sam.e m.arket as the
broadcaster '-^^.
e) Cable operators are in a de facto monopoly position
Their situation is comparable to the Otter Tail case, v/here
an electric power retail supplier held a lav.'ful acquired
monopoly under the Federal Pov.'er Act, but v/as nevertheless
held to violate the antitrust laws through its refusals to
deal with other potential suppliers of v/hclesale power ^^^ .
Cable operators need a franchise from, the city to v/ire the
homes. The award of a franchise has been subjected to
various conditions, and one of the purposes of the 19S4
Cable Act was to bring order in the disparate local
regulations that tried to organize an auctioning am.ong the
candidates willing to provide the city v/ith the best
available system. The antitrust aspects of the franchising
29d Two products will not be considered substitutes if
the market assigns a distinctly higher price to one of
them. ( See Ch. VI . 2 . ) From a consum.ers point of viev;,
broadcasting is a "free" service, v;hile cable is a service
to be paid for. From an advertiser point of viev;, hov.'ever,
the cable and broadcaster audiences are recognized increas-
ingly as perfect substitutes. Gregory , supra , note 125, at
649.
2^^ Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States 410 U.S. 366
(1973)
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process by the cities are not v;ithin the scope of this
research. Suffice it to say that the 19 3 4 Cable Act is
unclear as whether it tolerates the franchising authority
to grant only one franchise for a particular area -^^ .
In Preferred Coirununications , the Suprerr.e Court
refused to accept the franchising restrictions of the City
of Los Angeles, permitting only one cable operator in its
area, since the complaint evidenced enough physical
capacity and economic demand for an overbuild 298^ g^^ ^ug
Court did not go so far as the Ninth Circuit's lov/er
decision, suggesting that the franchising system of Los
Angeles was unconstitutional 299^ jt did not want to decide
the antitrust and constitutional questions v/ithout a more
thoroughly developed record. The case is actually back to
the district court for a trial on the facts, one of the
most crucial being whether or not cable is a natural
monopoly 3 00 3 01.
2^' § 621(a)(1) authorizes a franchising authority to
award "one or more franchises v/ithin its jurisdiction". The
legislative history seems to indicate repugnance against
exclusive franchises. Brenner and Price , supra , note 6S, at
3.22
2^° City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comumunications
476 U.S. 488 (1986) See also notes 168 and 207
259 Preferred, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 19S5) at n. 11
300 Parsons , supra , note 37, at 73
301 Prior to the Cable Act , the natural m.onopoly
status of cable seemed to be accepted indirectly by the
Supreme Court in Community Comjr.unications Co. v. City of
Boulder 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (holding that Boulder's ordinan-
ce, temporarily prohibiting the e.xpansion of the e.'-iisting
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2. Relevance of the Natural Monopoly Approach
Defining a Cable system as a natural rr.cnopcly has tv;c
purposes. From a regulatory point of viev;, it may provide
an argumem: for regulation. The degree of this regulation
can vary from must-carry rules, access rules up to a
framework similar to that of a public utility. From, an
antitrust point of viev;, the natural m.onopoly situation m.ay
facilitate the proof of monopoly pov.'er in the cable m.arket.
Antitrust lav/s, hov/ever, require specific intent to
monopolize. How this intent could be inferred from, the
natural monopoly position of the facility v/ill be examined
at the end of this chapter.
a) Analogy with the Scarcity Rationale
Natural monopoly offers a strong analogy to the
scarcity rationale adopted by the Suprem.e Court in Red Lion
and subsequent cases ^02^ rj^j-^g physical constraints of the
broadcast spectrum and the econc.mic structure of the cable
industry are analogous, in that they lim.it the n^um.ber of
speakers who want to contribute to the m.arket. As demon-
franchised system was not exem.pt from, antitrust scrutiny
under the "state action" doctrine as announced in Parker v
Brown 317 U.S. 341 (1943))
For an analysis of Boulder, see Botein, Nev.' Comjnuni-
cations Technology : The Em.erging Antitrust Agenda
,
Comm./Ent. L.J. 685, 689 (1981)
For an analysis of Parker v. Brov;n , see Susm.an £.•
Wawro , State Action Immunity And Antitrust Issues In Cable
TV Franchising
, 3 Comm./Ent. L.J. 64 5 (19S2)
202 See Ch. I. and notes 30-39
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strated above, -^^-^ cable technology is net immune from
scarcity restraints, and its physical structure in the
implantation of the system, in a franchise area creates a
particular type of scarcity that cannot be reduced to
economic factors alone 304 _ Just as limitations on the
available spectrum make it impossible for m.ore than a
chosen few to utilize the airv;aves, so m.akes the structure
of most cable markets it nearly im.possible for m.ore than
one cable operator to "speak" in any m.arket. The physical
interference that would result from, the absence of broad-
cast licensing has a complement in the cable industry's
tendency toward destructive com.petition -^^^ . As a result,
unlimited discretion by the cable operator as to the use of
its channels capacity is inappropriate.
b) Cable as an Essential Facility
Under an antitrust analysis, the unique position of a
cable operator has also been regarded as that of an
essential facility 306^ This doctrine, for the purpose of
303 Supra, note 232
^^'^ The Quincy court did so, referring to Tornillo to
conclude that "purely econom.ic constraints on the num.ber of
voices available in a given comjnunity do not justify
intrusion into First Amendment rights". See 75S F.2d at
1450 and note 213.
^^-^ Gregory , supra , note 125, at 651
^^^ Botein , supra , note 267, at 8S7. See also Botein,
New Communications Technology : The Em.erging Antitrust
Agenda , Comm./Ent. L.J. 685, 6S9 (1981)
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reasonable access, treats scarce resource or natural
advantage monopolies the way regulatory lav; treats a public
utility 307^ Such an approach, although historically
relevant --^^ , is inconsistent with the construction of the
Cominunications Act today. Regulating cable as a public
utility v/ould give it the status of a common carrier, v/hich
was clearly not the intent of Congress v/hen the Cable Ac~
was enacted ^0^. Although it can be argued that cable
television meets the requirements of a public utility ^^'^
,
ins model would fail to provide the special circum.stances
the courts have required to justify governm.ental interven-
tion in the First Amendment rights of the individual ^^-^ .
Unlike other forms of public utilities, cable system,
activities are too content related to subm-it them, to a
detailed public utility law.
'^'^' L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Lav.' of Antitrust , 125
(1977) The doctrine was first developed in U.S. v . Term.inal
Railroad Association of St. Louis 22 4 U.S. 3 33 (1912)
(Sherman Act was used to com.pel a group of railroads, which
jointly controlled St. Louis access and term.inal facili-
ties, to reform the term.s of their agreem.ents so as to
permit nonmiember lines to use these facilities)
308 p2-j_o2^ to the Cable Act , many states have tried to
regulate CATV as a public utility. Parsons , supra , notie 37,
at 137
^*^^ Supra , note 120
^^^ Recall the critique of J. Roberts' dissenting
opinion in Associated Press v. United States that AP should
not be treated as a public utility. See 325 U.S. at 4S and
note 272
•^'^ Posner, supra , note 2S8, at 145
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This dees not prevent that a cable operator should be
subject to duties imposed en ether "bottleneck facilities".
Such a duty can arise from, legislative action or from, a
court order. We have already referred to U.S. v. Term.inal
Railroad Ass'n -"-^^ and Otter Tail Pov/er Co. ' , where a
facility with monopoly pov;er, respectively de facto or de
lege , was forced to give access to com.petitcrs . The Suprem.e
Court has stressed that the legitim.ate right of a firm, to
refuse to deal with other firm.s was not unqualified. In
Lorain Journal v. United States ^'^^ the refusal of the only
newspaper in a comimunity to deal with custom.ers v/ho engaged
in advertising activities with a local radio station v/as
sanctioned:
The right claimed by a publisher is neither
absolute nor exempt from regulation. Its
exercise as a purposeful means of m.onopolizing
interstate comimerce is prohibited by the
Sherman Act. The operator of the radio station,
equally with the publisher of the nev/spaper, is
entitled to the protection of that Act. In the
absence of any purpose ro create or m.aintain a
'rmonopoly , the act does not restrict the lone
recognized right of trader or m.anuf acturer . . .
freely to exercise his own independent discre-
tion as to carties with whom he v;ill deal" -'-^-'
^^2 Supra , note 307
^^^ Supra
, note 296
314 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (hereinafter Lorain Journal)
^^^ Id. at 155, quoting U.S. v. Colgate & Co. 2 50 U.S.
at 3 07, Associated Press v. U.S. 326 U.S. at 15 and U.S. v
.
Bausch & Lomb Co. 321 U.S. 721-723 (original em.phasis)
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This holding was reaffirmed by the Court in Aspen Skiing
Co. V. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. ^-^^ In that oase the
operauor of Aspen's most important ski lift resorts refused
to continue to deal with a sm.aller com.petitor. As a result,
the number of mountains that could skied on v;ith one single
ticket was reduced from four to three. This dim.inished the
quality of the ski-market as a v.'hole, since cons'umers
preferred to use as many resorts as possible. The m.arket
share of the remaining ski lift operator on the fourth
mountain declined rapidly as a result of the term.ination of
the agreement. The Court upheld the decision of the Tenth
Circuit granting a treble dam.ages suit against the m.cnopo-
listic ski-operator on the ground that "if a firm, has been
attempting to exclude its rivals on som.e basis other than
efficiency, it is fair to characterize its behavior as
predatory" ^^'. The case contains many analogies to the
situation of a cable operator: overbuilds in the area v;ere
impossible for regulatory and practical reasons -^^^ . The
ski lift resorts were recognized as "essential facilities"
by the Court of A.ppeals. Consum.er dem.and and preference
played an important role in the decision. More problem.atic
is the fact that in Aspen discontinuation of the agreem.ent
could not be justified by sound business judgment, and was
^1^ 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (hereinafter Aspen )
317 T,id. at 605
318 Id. at 588 : city regulations ey.isted and U.S.
Forest Service approval was required to build a system..
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only explainable as an attempt to elL^ninate the ccrr.peti-
tion: there was no other advantage gained by the refusal
than the motivation "to sacrifice short-run benefits and
consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run
impact on its smaller rival" ^^^. In the case of a cable
operator, his decision to drop a broadcaster does not
necessarily express such an intent: it v;ill be inspired by
the need for an extra channel available v/hich, in the
operator's business judgment, he considers more im.portant
to carry than that of the local broadcaster. There is no
case providing the argum.ent that a court could reject such
a judgment on the grounds that it violates the operator's
duties to favor local programming.
319 Id. at 5:
CHAPTER VI
FILING ANTITRUST SUITS TO OBTAIN CABLE CARRIAGE
The purpose of this chapter is to examine to v.'hat
extent a broadcaster may seek relief before the courts to
be carried on a cable system, absent any must-carry
regulation. This requires the proof of abuse of monopoly
position by the cable operator v.'ithin a relevant geogra-
phical market and for a relevant product market. In the
previous chapter, we have demonstrated that there is am.ple
ground to accept the monopolistic position of a cable
operator and his potential anticom.petitive behavior.
However, such a finding is not sufficient to find a
violation of the antitrust lav.'s. As will be pointed out in
the subsequent pages, the determ.ination of the relevant
product market is crucial for the outcom.e of the suit, and
it is precisely on this point that the courts seem, to be in
disagreement. The extent to v;hich courts are v/illing to
consider the cable carriage market as separate from, other
home video markets will determ.ine largely if antitrust
litigation is an appropiate alternative for government
regulation in this matter.
At first glance, it would seem that broadcasters and
cable systems do not compete since they are in a different
98
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business. Eut since antitrust lav.'s are also concerned about
consumers interests and their viev/point is detern?.inative
for defining a market and their cc:npetitcrs ^20^ ^p^^ ^^p>
argue that for a cable television viev.'er programs from a
broadcaster or from basic cable service are indifferen-
tiated ^21^ From the business perspective, both business
compete for the same viev.'ers and advertising dollars by
offering real-time video-programm.ing to the public.
It is possible to identify three main categories of
antitrust violations: horizontal agreem.ents , vertical
agreem.ents and structural restraints ^22^ Q^y. approach
focuses on the problem between a broadcaster and a cable
operator. It does not presuppose any restrictive agreem.ent
between the cable operator and any other program, supplier
^2j. Therefore we will consider only those antitrust lav;s
that are concerned with structural restraints, resulting in
an unlawful maintenance of monopoly -^24^
^20 United States v. E.I, du Pont de Nem.ours S Co. 351
U.S. 377 (1956). See also notes 346.
3 21 See note 3 63 for the prevalence of the viev;ers
perspective in New York Citizens Committee on Cable T^f v.
Manhattan Cable TV, Inc. 651 F.Supp. S02 (S.D.N.Y. 19S6)
commented at Ch. VI. 3. b.
322 Botein, supra , nore 267, at 879
323 Although the market-analysis for such a hypotheti-
cal situation would be identical.
324 since cable television companies offer services,
some antitrust laws are not applicable. Such is the case
for example with § 3 of the Clayton Act, which covers only
"goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supply or other
commoddities"
. See, e.g.
,
Satellite Television v. Continen-
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1) The Relevant Law
The first important instrument against alleged
monopolization of the market is Section 2 of the Sherman
Act ^^^. Market power is here the key to determ.ine whether
monopoly power exists 326^ This market power can be proved
by evidence of actual control over prices or the actual
exclusion of competitors ^27^ j^ ^q such actual control or
exclusion is found, a complete econom.ic evaluation of the
relevant market structure is necessary to determ.ine v;hether
the firms size or its control over price, supply or entry
constitutes a monopoly 328^ -pj-^g existence of monopoly may
also be inferred from a company's predom.inant m.arket share
^2°. These factors alone are not sufficient: in addition, a
specific intent to use and to m.aintain that monopoly pov/er
must be shown ^^'^
.
tal Cablevision 714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 19S3) cert, denied
465 U.S. 1027 (1984), commented infra at note 373
^25 15 u.S.C.A. § 1
-^2° Rosen, Media Cross-Ownership, Effective Enforce-
ment Of Antitrust Laws, And The FCC , 3 2 Fed. Comjn. L.J. No
1, 105-147 (Winter 1981)
^^' See, e.g.
.
United States v. Aluminium. Co. of
Am.erica 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
328 For an enumeration of all these factors see e.g3
United States v. Griffith 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (m.onopoliza-
tion of a film distribution m.arket)
3 29 See United States v. Grinnel Corp. 3 84 U.S. 563
(1966) and Rosen , supra , note 326, at 107
'^^^ See United States v. Griffith 334 U.S. 100 (1948)
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Another relevant statute is Section 7 of the Clayton
Act 331; it is the appropiate instrument to attack
concentrations which occur as a result of horizontal or
"3
-^
•-)
vertical integrations m a market ^^^. Our approach does
not directly deal with such a situation, but both Section 2
of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act rest
upon the concept of "monopoly" , v/hich in turn requires
reference to the relevant m.arket in order to determ.ine a
firm's share in the market -^^-'. Since examination of the
market is based upon the same standards for both lav;s '^^^
,
and some of the case-lav; referred to hereunder is dealing
with a claim under the Clayton Act -^-', we include conside-
rations about Section 7 in this chapter ^^^ -^'.
^-"-^ This section prohibits any merger or acquisition
"where in any line of commerce . . . the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen com.petition, or
to tend to create a monopoly". (15 U.S.C.A. § 15)
•^^2 Bennett, Media Concentration and the FCC :
Focusing with A Section Seven Lens 6 6 Mv.'.U.L. Rev. 15 9 (1971)
^^^ Botein , supra , note 267, at 893
334 See United States v. Grinell Corp. 3S4 U.S. 563
335 See Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. Home Video,
Inc. , 825 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 19S7), infra, note 37Q
3j6 Mergers and acquisitions can take three different
forms : the first is a "horizontal" merger (i.e. between
competitors on the same stage of production), the second a
"vertical" merger (between two com.panies active on diffe-
rent levels of production or distribution) , the third is
called a "conglomerate" merger (i.e. a com.bination of
both). Generally, vertical and conglom.erate m.ergers recieve
more symphatetic treatment from the courts, because they
are often found not to elim.inate any com.petition betv/een
existing firms.
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2) The Relevant Market
The analysis in defining a relevant eccno.Tiic rr.arket
involves consideration of two separate types of markets:
first, a product market, and second, a geographic market
33S
a) Product Market
Defining a product market is im.portant for tv/o
reasons. First, the more products included in a product
market, the larger it becomes, and thus the sm.aller any
individual's share becomes. Second, the definition of the
product market naturally tends to influence the definition
of the geographic market by im.pacting on the determ.inaticn
as to the relevant products, and thus on the area of
effective competition among separate firm.s ^-'^.
There is little case-law that has attem.pted to define
product markets for the comjnunications m.edia. Many m.oncpc-
lization claims against cable television operators v.'ere
filed by direct competitors on the ground that they had
prevented other companies from securing cable television
^^
' Vertical integration in the telecomjriunications
market is extremely attractive because m.ost of the .nev;
media operate as buyers and sellers in a n^um.ber of m.arkets
simiultaneously. ( Botein , supra , note 267, at SS5) The
abscence of any ownership restrictions in the cable-
industry and the many economic incentives to integrate the
business with program-retailers or suppliers explain the
high rise of mergers in this sector the last years.
^^^ Botein , supra , note 267, at 882
339 Id.
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franchises in the same area ^40^ Recently, the deregulation
of cable gave rise to some more litigation with respect to
mergers ^'^-^. The relevant product market for the television
media may take a number of different form.s: in looking at
cable, STV, iMBS or DBS, a court m.ight hold the relevant
product market to be one of the follov.'ing: all types of
entertainment, all commercial radio and television sta-
tions, all television stations, all methods for transm.it-
ting pay programming, or just one m.ethod for transmitting
pay programming ^^^. It could distinguish the basic
programiming service from the extra pay programjning service.
It could also include video-cassettes and define the m.arket
as "passive visual entertainment" -^'^^-
From a broadcaster or cable operator viev/point, the
product market would include, at the very least, all
methods for delivering real-tim.e video programjning to a
viewer. But one could argue that the comjnercial functioning
of a cable operator and a broadcaster is so different that
^^0 These claims were dismissed on varying grounds,
one of the most interesting being the Noer-Pennington
doctrine : there is no cause of action under the Sherm.an
Act for defendant licensee to make political contributions
and misrepresentations for the purpose of elim.inating cable
television competitors where these actions are legitim.ate
efforts to influence legislative decisions-m.aking. Susm.an &
Wawro, supra , note 301, at 650
^'^'^ See the case-law infra , at notes 350-376.
^^^ Bennett
,
supra , note 332, at 159
^^^ See Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. Hom.e Video,
I no
.
discussed infra, note 370
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both cannot be considered as competing in the same market.
A court could distinguish both on a difference betv/een
advertiser-supported programming and pay-programjning ^44^
It could conclude that broadcasters and cable operators do
not compete in the same market since the form.er receives
its revenues from advertisers and the latter from, subscrip-
tion fees. Both, however, sell advertising tim.e and aim, to
reach an audience. In Lorain Journal v. United States ^ -^
the Supreme Court, without explicitly analysing the
relevant market, accepted that a nev/spaper could engage in
monopolistic behavior by boycotting advertisem.ent of its
customers who also advertised through the local radio
station. Although not advertising through the sam.e m.edium.
,
the newspaper could affect the business of the local
station since both of them were com.peting for advertising
dollars which in turn depended upon the reach of their
respective readers or listeners. A fortiori , a broadcaster
and cable operator should be considered as operating in the
same market, since they both aim to reach a viev.'ing
audience with a real-time video programjning product.
344 jf ^Yie relevant market were to be construed from,
an advertisers point of view, virtually all other adverti-
sing media - from billboards to local daily nev.'spapers -
might be included . Proof of m.onopolization in such a large
market would consequently becomie im.possible.
2*^5 342 U.S. 143 (1951) See also note 314
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b) Functional Interchangeability Of Products
The test applied by the courts to decide what
products to include within a single product market uses the
notion of functional interchangeability of products, as
viewed by potential buyers. This consumers point of viev;
was adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v. S.I.
du Pont de Nem.ours & Co. ^'^^: the determining factor for
identifying a market is the degree to which consum.ers
consider different products as substituable for each other.
The relevant product market contained "those products or
services which are reasonably interchangeable by consumers
for the same purpose" ^'^'7. in terms of television markets,
it means that the court should examine to v/hat extent
viewers v/ill consider cable television programjning a
separate product from STY, DBS or video cassettes, for
example. In delineating cable and broadcast m.arkets, the
interchangeability of products could be strongly influenced
by the mandatory A/B switch on a cable system decoder set
•^^°. But so far no court has yet faced this issue.
c) Geographic Market
The geographic market usually is the area in which a
firm sells in active and reasonably equal com.petiticn v;ith
^"^^ 351 U.S. 377 (1956) See also note 320
-^'^ Id^ at 395
3^^ Supra , note 227
iU6
Other firms. As with product markets, there has beePx a
tendency to borrow from geographic m.arket tests used in
merger cases under Section 7 of the Clayton Act ^^^ . in
this case, the geographic market definition could be easily
defined as the area where the reach of the cable system and
that of the broadcast transmitter coincide.
Since the plaintiff in an antitrust C3.se bears the burden
of proof on the issue of the relevant product and geogra-
phic market, he has the following elements to prove:
1) broadcast programs and cable programs target the
same viewers market in a certain geographic area.
2) in that area, there is no reasonable substituabi-
lity between programming offered through cable system.s and
other video programming.
3) refusal to carry the broadcaster on the cable
system results in a unlav/ful maintenance of an, otherv.'ise
lawfully acquired, monopoly.
^^^ Comment, Relevant Geographic Market Delineation :
The Interchangeability Of Standards In Cases Arising Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 1979 Duke L.J. 1152
107
3) The Case- Law ^^^
To date there is no decision that h3.s faced directly
the situation where a broadcaster tried to sue a cable
operator under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for refusal to
carry his signal. This can be explained by the fact that
must-carry was only recently abolished ^-'-^ and that some
cases are still before the court ^^'^. In addition, many
cable systems continue to carry the local broadcaster for
their own economic interest '^^^
.
There is authority, however, offering argum.ent for
such a case, although a large definition cf the product
m.arket in some circuits may render the burden cf proof
almost impossible.
^-'^ Some cf the cases cited in this chapter v;ere
provided in a lecture by David J. Saylor to the Practising
Lav; Institute in New York on March 9, 1989 : Selected
Antitrust Issues Facing Cable Television . The outline and
cases of this lecture can be found in the PLI Pub. Mo. 2 57
Vol. 2 (1989) p. 107-210.
-^-'^ The Century Communications decision dates from.
Dec. 1987.
^^^ See , e.g. , UTV of San Francisco, Inc. v. National
Amusements, Inc. et al. No. 87-3831 (Calif. Sup. Ct. S.F.
Co., complaint filed April 7, 1987) (alleging that cable
operator's movement of broadcaster to less desirable
channel violated state antitrust an unfair ccm.petiticn lav.'s
)
^^^ Supra
, note 258
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a) Standing of a Broadcaster
In Midland Telec a sting Co. v. Midessa Televisicr. Co
the Fifth Circuit held -.hat a broadcast station had
standing under the antitrust laws to challenge refusal of
carriage by a cable operator, v/hioh v.'as ov;ned by tv/o
broadcast competitors. The District Court for the Western
District of Texas initially rejected the clai.^. for treble
damages and injunctive relief under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act on the ground that the FCC carriage regulations
created an implied immunity from effect of antitrust lav.'s.
The Court of Appeals reversed.
The refusal to carry the broadcast signal resulted in
loss of advertising revenues and finally in ceasing its
activities: such an injury flev; clearly from, defendant's
group boycott or refusal to deal ^^^. The implied immiunity
was rejected on the ground that the m.ere fact that a
business decision was subject to a degree of regulatory
control did not automatically result in an antitrust
immunity ^^°. The court also refused to find a requirem.ent
354
^5^ 617 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1980) cert, denied 449
U.S. 954 (hereinafter Midland )
^55 Midland 617 F.2d at 1145
^^^ Id. at 1148, quoting Otter Tail Pov;er Co. v. U.S.
410 U.S. 366 (1973), supra , note 296 and United States v.
RCA 358 U.S. 334 (1959) (FCC m.ay consider antitrust policy
in the public interest but may not decide antitrust issues
as such. The 1934 Communications Act v;as not intended to
prevent enforcement of the antitrust lav.'s in federal courts)
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that the broadcaster first exhausts ad.T.inistrative re.T.e-
dies as a prerequisite to bringing an antitrust suit ^^ '
.
b) The New York Citizens Committee Case
In New York Citizens Ccrrjnittee on Cable Television v.
Manhatten Cable TV. Inc. ^^^ the Southern District of New
York held that subscribers had standing to raise a Shern?.an
Section 2 claim against a cable operator v/ho refused to
deal with unaffiliated programmers. The court defined the
relevant market as the pay cable television m.ovies and non-
sports entertainment for the franchise area of lov/er
Manhattan. The injury to the consum.ers-subscribers v/as
caused by the improper exlusion of com.petitors fromi the
market resulting in higher subscription fees. This case,
although settled -^^^
,
and dealing with a conflict between
cable subscribers and cable operators, is of great impor-
tance because of its approach to the definition of the
relevant market in the field of visual entertairjr.ent and
^^ ' Id. at 1149. For more details about the concept of
primary jurisdiction between the FCC and the Justice Dpt.,
see Botein , supra , note 267, at 897.
2^2 651 F.Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (hereinafter N.Y.
Cit. Comm. ) settled . Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep., Vol. 53
Dec. 17, 1987, at 918
^^5 Defendants agreed to add an unaffiliated pay
channel.
no
its reply on the First Amendment defense after the Quincy
-5 (T o
decision -^^.
1. Definition Of The Market
The court correctly distinguished bet'.veen three
interdependent markets ^^-: l) the retail market, in v/hich
the cable operator sells a programjning-package to its
subscribers, and which enjoyed a lav.'ful m.onopoly by virtue
of the de facto exclusive city franchise 2) the v/holesale
market, in which various programm.ers compete nationv;ide to
sell their programs to cable operators. No m.onopolization
claim was made with respect to this market. 3) the m.arket
at issue was the one in which the programjner, at the sam.e
time owner of the operator, com.peted v;ith other unaffili-
ated services for the consum.er dollars of the Manhattan's
viewing public ^^^ . in that market, the cable programjTier
was guaranteed a monopoly position through the refusal of
the operator to deal with other programm.ers. Hence he v/as
fully protected from taking in account price decision of
360 rjnj^^g right of standing for the subscribers comjr.it-
tee resulted from rhe allegation that subscribers had to
pay higher prices as a result of the predatory behavior.
The court had not, therefore, to consider the argum.ent of
lack of choice for consumers combined v.'ith a dim.inution in
quality of the services for a right of standing under
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. U.S. 356 U.S. 1 (195S) and
Standard Oil Co. v. U.S. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
^^1 N.Y. Cit. Comjn. 651 F.Supp. at 807
^°'^ The court made an analogy with the sale of
different brands of cookies in the only authorized grcces
in town. Id. at 807
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these competitors and therefore in a position to charge
monopolistic prices. The court accepted plaintiff's
definition of the product market as that for pay cable
television movies and non-sports entertainm.ent . It found
that this market could be distinguished from the "basic"
cable service, in that there v/as not enough interchangea-
bility between the competing programmers products and the
other programming provided by the cable system,. It conclu-
ded so on the premise that the perspective of the cable
subscriber is of the utmost importance in defini.ng the
relevant product market •^°^.
2 . The First ;^jnendm.ent Defense
The defendants relied heavily on their right for
editorial discretion to challenge any injunctive order from.
the court. The opinion called such defense "prem.ature" and
noted that in Preferred the Suprem.e Court had not decided
which First i^jnendment standard of revieuv; should apply v/ith
respect to cable 3°^. it commented also the Quincy decision
and concluded that even if it v;ould follov; the stricter
standard laid down by the Second Circuit, the injunction
^"^ Id. at 808, quoting Levitch v. Colum.bia Broadcas-
ting System, Inc. 495 F.Supp. 664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) aff 'd
697 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1983) (independent producers of
documentary series charged unsuccessfully the three
networks of monopolization of the docum.entary film market.
The court defined the market for that situation as the
entire national viewing public)
^^^ Id^ at 818
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sought for by plaintiffs would still be justifiable under
the O'Brien test.
An injunction compelling (defendant) to offer
programming which it has elected not to carry
in the interest of furthering com.petition
between programmers is "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression" ( O ' Erien , 391
U.S. at 377). Such an injunction is not
"intended to curtail expression ..." (but to)
allow competition in the programmer's m.arket,
an injunction neutral on its face to different
speakers and speech, providing only that there
is more than one speaker. ^^^
The purpose of the antitrust lav;s to encourage com.petition
for the ultimate benefit of consumers v;ould appear to be a
substantial governmental interest 2*56 _ Unlike the Quincy
case, both parties here enjoyed First Am.endm.ent rights. The
injunction would also satisfy the preference of the
plaintiff cable subscribers, v/hich v/as consistent v;ith the
Supreme Court admonishment that the "interest of viev.'ers
should be considered paramount in the First Am.endm.ent
calculus" ^^'.
c) The Approach Of The Eleventh And Fourth Circuit
The previous cases may provide grounds fcr a succes-
ful suit by a broadcaster: the consum.er-orientated approach
^°^ Id. at 818, quoting Heme Box Office 567 F.2d at
47-48
^^^ Id_^ at 819
^^"^ Id.
,
quoting Quincy 768 F.2d at 1453 and Red Lion
395 U.S. at 3 90
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of the New York Circuit could easily defeat the argument
that cable and broadcast are not operaiiing in the same
market. From a television-watching viewpoint, basic pay-
programming is indif ferentiated as to its source, cable or
broadcast originated. In turn, it is differentiated from,
other forms of home entertainment, some on an eccnom.ic
basis ^^8^ other on a more practical basis ^^5^
This view, favorable for our purposes, v/as blov/n av/ay
in a recent opinion of the 11th Circuit in 19S7: Cable
Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. Home Video, Inc. -^'^ . The
decision upheld a jury finding that the appropiate product
market for a Section 7 claim, in a m.erger betv/een tv.'o
competing cable companies was the "passive visual enter-
tainment, which includes cable television, satellite
television, video cassette recordings, and free over-the-
air-television" ^'-. Consequently, the challenged merger
could not control the product market, and the claim. v;as
dismissed. The court did not want to interfere with this
factfinding, unless it was "clearly erroneous" ^"^2, jt
368 Pay-TV channels will be charged extra for.
3° 5 T^g2 or VCR require separate receiving or viev/ing
equipment, and should not be considered, therefore, as
belonging to the same market.
^"7° 825 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1987) (opinion delivered
by C.J. Adamson)
3^^ Id^ at 1563
^'^ Id. , referring to National Bancard Corp. v. Visa
U.S.A. 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986) cert, denied 479 U.S.
923 (1986)
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referred to a 198 3 decision of the Fourth Circuit v/here a
similar market determination remained undefeated: Satellite
Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental
Cablevision or Virginia, Inc. -^ ' ^ . The case involved an
unsuccesful antitrust action against defendant cable
distribution company challenging the latters exclusivity
provision under which appartment ov.'ners had the option
either to wire their building on their ov/n expense or to
give the operator exclusive pay television rights to their
appartments. The District Court, applying the Dupont test
^''^, found that "cinema, broadcast television, video disks
and cassettes, and other types of leisure and entertain-
ment-related businesses for customers v/ho live in single-
family appartment houses all m.et the requirements of the
test" . The court did not accept plaintiffs definition of
pay television services as a "submarket", since it "adds
only confusion to an already im.precise and com.plex endavor"
'^'^. The proof of lack of interchangeability betv;een the
products was on plaintiff: "(he) m.ust shov; that because
consumers do not perceive entertair„ment m.edia to be
reasonably interchangeable with pay television or because
^"7^ 714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1983) (hereinafter Satel-
lite Television ) cert, denied 465 U.S. 1Q27
^'^ The relevant product miarket exists of "those
products or services which are reasonably interchangeable
by consumers for the same purposes" U.S. v. E.I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co. 351 U.S. 377 (1956) See also supra , note 347
^"^^ Satellite Television 714 F.2d 355 at n. 5
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of some market limitation on the ability of the produoers
of reasonably interchangeable prcducts to increase volume
over the relevant dem.and range, that pay television is the
relevant market " -^ "^
.
d) Conclusion
The above cited cases demonstrate that a broadcaster
has a right of standing under the Sherman Act to challenge
a refusal of carriage by the cable operator if the follcv-
ing requirements are met:
1) in order to proof damages, he must have been previously
carried on the system. A new broadcaster v;ould therefore
not be able to seek relief under the antitrust laws.
2) he must proof that the refusal to carry was not inspired
by valid business reasons but was intended mainly to
eliminate the competition.
3) he must proof the relevant product m.arket by shov;ing a
low cross -elasticity of dem.and am.ong consumers betv/een
cable at one hand and other types of visual entertainm.ent
at the other hand.
These requirements, although not im.possible to
fulfill, make it very difficult to sue successfully. It is
therefore doubtful to rely on antitrust enforcem.ent to
compensate the harmful effects of absence of m.ust-carry
requirements
.
^"^^ Id. at 356
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
This thesis intended to explore the lav.' of broadcast
and cable regulation in search of co.Tjnon concerns for
safeguarding diversity in ov;nership and content. Starting
from the fact that the mass media form, a v.'hole in v;hich the
boundaries between the different types of comjnunication
become increasingly difficult to distinguish, v;e have
examined the history of cable television and its struggle
to evolve from a public utility model to a fully recognized
mass medium with First Amendment rights. This struggle was
successful in part because it occurred in the m.idst of a
political climate favoring deregulation in the broadcast
media and a miarketplace philosophy tov/ards econom.ic regula-
tion in general. Critique v.'as developed against this
philosophy in that it seemed to rely too m.uch on the
marketforces to guarantee diversity of ov.'nership and ideas.
With respect to cable television, the problem, v.'as hov.' to
reconcile two contrasting positions of cable's role: the
issue around the constitutionality of m.ust-carry rules v.'as
analyzed to give a clear example of this problem,.
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The previous chapter has demonstrated that antitrust
enforcement as an alternative for must-carry is not
satisfactory. The antitrust laws are not fit enough to
safeguard such an important but a-econom,ic goal as diversi-
ty and local programming. In addition, this goal is
countered by the position of cable operators as a natural
monopoly, preventing the forces of ccm.petitive threat to
assure some minimum level of diversity.
It is clear that the recant evolutions in the
telecommunications area do not v/eaken the argum.ents for
protecting diversity ^''. While the nev/ technologies may
end the problem of physical scarcity, their patterns of
ownership may create scarcity in the m.arketplace of ideas,
and should therefore be regulated under sim.ilar rationales
as for the ownership rules in the broadcasting sector. The
scarcity that is at stake here is not caused by economical
constraints -^"^^ but by a corporate policy to grow bigger
and bigger and to enhance its position in the marketplace
of ideas. Since measurement of such concentration is very
difficult, preventive regulation is m.ore appropriate than
antitrust litigation or reliance on the m.arketforces
.
377 5ee Chapters III. 3. a., V.2.a. and notes 231-232
and 302-305
^'° The courts have stressed that economic scarcity is
insufficient ground to justify even lim.ited governm.ent
intrusion into First Amendm.ent rights. Home Box Office , 567
F.2d at 46 (1977), Tornillo , 41S U.S. 246-253 (1974), and
supra , notes 163 and 213
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Arguing for reimposition of must-carry rules, albeit
in a less stringent way than proposed in 1965, is not to
deny freed speech rights to cable operators: the Supreme
Court has stressed that every right is qualified ^'^'^ . The
decision to cancel carriage of a local signal, if unchal-
lenged under antitrust law because a valid business reason
can be demonstrated 380^ could be prohibited under a
diversity approach of the FCC's policy tasks, defined in
the public interest standard -^81^
The goal of diversity can only be guaranteed through
regulatory action, interpreting the ComjTiunications Act in a
way consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in Red
Lion, Storer Broadcasting and League of Wom.en Voters ^°^ .
Although these cases all developed in a broadcasting
context they are relevant for cable policy as v;ell, since
they share the viewing public as a comjnon interested party.
Rethinking the role of the public interest standard and
revalorizing the interest of the viev;ing public v/ill be one
of the major tasks for today's telecomjnunications policy
makers. With the new Administration, reregulation m.ay be
expected, in which Congress will ask a quid pro quo for the
^'^ Lorain Journal , 342 U.S. at 155, supra , note 315
^2° Supra , note 319
-^°l The FCC has broad discretionary pov;ers to inter-
pret the public interest standard. Supra , Ch. I.l.b. 3ina.
note 49
^°^ See respectively notes 30, 61 and 181
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broadcasters' aspirations: reim.position of must-carry v/ill
be given in exchange for new rules on Fairness ^°-^ . It is
regrettable in this respect that the proposed legislation
to reimpose must-carry via the compulsory license system,
neglects the opportunity to ref c^rm.ulate a fev.' issues that
-5 Q /I
we have explored m this thesis -Q'*: Congress could have
provided the "guidelines" the judiciary was asking for to
determine cable's First Am.endm.ent rights. The D.C. Court of
Appeals stressed that not any form of m.ust-carry v/as
unconstitutional ^85^ ^^^ ^-j^q Cable Policy Act could have
been amended in a way that v/ould pass m.uster on the
constitutional scrutiny of the courts.
At the same time, it would have clarified the vague and
unrealized goals stated in the Act about diversity and
anti-concentration 386^ This Congressional mandate alone
should already enable the FCC to develop an appropriate
policy.
^°^ Dan Springer, The Pendulum Swings : Reregulation
Is Coming Back, As Cable TV Becom.es The Focus Of A Variety
Of Comm.unications Issues , Channels Field Guide 19S9, at 35
Peter Ainslie, Making The Though Calls , Channels,
January 198 9, at 6 3
Hill Showdown : A Year Of Decision , Channels, January
1989, at 64-67
Cable Traffic , Wall Street Journal, April 4, 1989
Broadcasters Seek Cable Reregulation In Nev; Legisla-
tion , Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1989
^S4 Supra , note 256
^2^ Supra , note 230
386 rj-ij^^g p^^^^ explicitly states goals of diversity and
anti-concentration. See Ch. I.2.C.I. and notes 126-131
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Finally, this thesis will conclude v.'ith a more
general view about the degree of regulation required for
cable television in our society of tcmorrov;. It is clear
that the issue of must-carry v.'ili become marginal once the
telco-industry enters in competition v/ith the cable
industry ^° . Withm a few years, the competitive landscape
may have changed all over again, shov;ing nev; form.s of
monopoly in the information and entertainm.ent m.arket. The
technical developments in the telecomjnunications sector
could make any attempt to regulate a specific m.edium. scon
obsolete. It is therefore param.ount for the courts and
Congress to formulate theories of First Amendment that are
resistant to changes in new technologies ^°° , and that are
applicable to all media in general.
We have stressed before that the nature of cable
television's activities and the evolution of lav; in
This threat has already driven broadcasters and
cable operators together to defend them.selves against a
common enemy, and diminished their antagonism around m.ust-
carry. Frank Lovece, Learning to Play in Sv;eet Harm.onv
,
Channels, January 1989, at 63-59
~'°° Congress attempted to do so with respect to
copyright issues when it enacted the 197 6 Copyrighr Act : §
102 of the Act grants protection to "original v/crks of
authorship, fixed in any tangible m.edium. of e.xpression, nov/
known or later developed " (17 U.S.C.A. § lQ2(a), em.phasis
added) . The Act dealt with the copyright problem.s for cable
television transmission, reviev/ing the Fortnightly (392
U.S. 390 (1968)) and Teleprom.pter (415 U.S. 394 (1974))
cases through its system of com.pulsory licenses (17 U.S.C.
Sec. 111). The Act, however, failed to give adequate
guidelines for technological features such as VCR's and
their use for home-taping. See Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. , 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ( hom.e
video taping is permissible as fair use)
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Congress and the courts do not justify regulation of cable
as a public utility ^°^ . A determination of the type of
regulation that should be applicable centers around the
problem of whose First Amendment rights are at stake. These
regulations and their justifications could be constructed
on a scale ranging from those totally lacking in social
utility to those totally dependent upon and subservient to
social utility 390^ Since cable involves a medium with
significant interest and impact for m.ore than one half of
the American population, its high degree of social utility
cannot be denied. If an equitable balancing of First
A-mendment rights is applied to this m.edi'um, minimum
standards for diversity should be established. These
standards could result in access for local broadcasters and
strong vigilance towards concentration of m.edia-m.arkets
.
-39 Supra , note 309
^'^^ Parsons , supra , note 37, at 82
^l,
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